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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The proceeding before the Third District Court was an action for breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith involving Dee Voy and Marian Tucker 
and all absent members of the proposed class of persons injured by the Defendant's 
misconduct (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), plaintiffs and appellants, and State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter "State Farm"), defendant and appellee, Civil 
number 9 8 0 9 0 7 3 6 9 . (R. 1). The primary issue presented to the district court was 
whether State Farm owed indemnification to Plaintiffs under their automobile insurance 
policies containing personal injury protection coverage ("PIP"). (R. 4). 
Other defendants before the district court were the tortfeasor, Maye Helen Potter, 
the insurance doctor, Stephen P. Marble, whose legal opinion regarding Plaintiffs' 
insurance policy was relied upon by State Farm, and the third-party insurance carrier, 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, whose interference with Plaintiffs' contract contributed to 
the Tuckers' loss. The tort case against Potter continues, and the court's dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' causes of action against Farmers and Dr. Marble were not appealed. 
State Farm refused to pay the expenses incurred by Plaintiffs because its doctor 
directed it to refuse to pay. (R. 2-3). State Farm's doctor is now employed by Farmers in 
connection with the defense of the Tuckers' tort claim against Farmers's insured. 
STATEMENT OF IURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). 
1 
COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On October 23, 2000 State Farm filed its motion to dismiss alleging that its 
affirmative defenses and the underlying merits should be resolved under Rule 12(b)(6). 
(R. 122). Plaintiffs responded with a motion to strike and a motion for partial summary 
judgment on November 6, 2000. (R. 239). The court's order granting State Farm's 
motion to dismiss (and purportedly transforming part of it into a Rule 56 motion) and 
denying Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment was filed February 6, 2001. (R. 
628). Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on March 2, 2001. (R. 645). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. May a trial court transform a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion 
where the party opposing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion has relied upon it being a motion dealing 
with purely legal issues? Reviewed for correctness. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (holding that a court may not unilaterally transform a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion). 
B. May a defendant raise the affirmative defense that claims are barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations in a Rule 12(b))(6) motion? Reviewed for correctness. 
Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 at n.l (Utah App. 1994) (citing Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) & 12(b)); Heritage Bank & 
Trust v.Landon, 770 P.2d 1009,1010 (Utah App. 1989). 
C. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant Plaintiffs' motion to strike 
2 
Defendant's motion to dismiss? Reviewed for correctness. Golding v. Ashley Cent. 
Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
D. Did the trial court err in ruling that the statute of limitations barred 
Plaintiffs' claims in light of the internal discovery rule, State Farm's breach of its fiduciary 
obligations, and the steps State Farm took to fraudulently conceal its unlawful conduct? 
Reviewed for correctness. Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996); Shire Dev. v. 
Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah App. 1990). 
E. Did the trial court err in ruling that an insured person's entitlement to PIP 
benefits is contingent upon the condition precedent or subject to a condition subsequent that a 
third-party (in this case a doctor retained by the PIP carrier) must subjectively deem expenses 
incurred by the insured person to be "reasonable and necessary" and "related" to the 
accident? Reviewed for correctness. Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos., 842 P.2d 865 
(Utah 1992). 
F. Did the trial court err in ruling that the seven exclusions and limitations 
set forth in the no-fault statute at section 309 were permissibly augmented by State Farm's 
"IME" doctor's disagreement with the treating physician? Reviewed for correctness. 
McCafferv v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990) (explaining that the Utah no-fault 
statute "prevents the insurer from excluding PIP benefits to its insureds except in seven 
narrowly defined situations" set forth in Section 309). 
G. Did the trial court err in ruling that Pennington v. Allstate permits State 
Farm's self-devised medical management exclusion even though this case does not involve 
any allegations that medical expenses were incurred in bad faith? Reviewed for correctness. 
3 
Jensen v. Eddv. 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973) ("If the reason for the rule is not 
present, the rule does not apply."). 
H. Did the trial court err in ruling that State Farm's breach of its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing would be first-party bad faith in the PIP context? Reviewed for 
correctness. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) 
(explaining that third-party bad faith exists where the parties have a confidential relationship 
and a corresponding duty of trust such as the relationship created by the no-fault statute). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS l 
1. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs paid an insurance premium to 
Defendant State Farm in return for which Defendant State Farm became obligated to 
provide, among other things, personal injury protection ("PIP") conforming to the 
requirements of the Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act as set forth at UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 & 309 (the "no-fault statute"). (R. 17-18). 
2. Plaintiffs purchased their PIP coverage from Defendant with a coverage limit 
1
 "A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly appears that the 
plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts 
they could prove to support their claim." Baker v. Angus. 910 P.2d 427 (Utah App. 
1996) (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)). The Court 
will accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Roark v. 
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Utah 1995) (citing Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764, 766 
(Utah 1991)). 
4 
of $5,000.002 per person per accident. (R. 145,155). 
3. On or about August 5,1994, Maye Helen Potter (whose vehicle was insured 
by Farmers Insurance Exchange) rear-ended the vehicle owned by Plaintiffs and insured 
by Defendant State Farm. (R. 18). 
4. As a result of their injuries, Plaintiffs' doctors prescribed tests and treatment 
for said injuries in good faith; thus Plaintiffs incurred medical expenses which totaled the 
sum of $5,104.71 and $5,380.00 for DeeVoy and Marian Tucker, respectively. (R. 24). 
5. Reasonable proof of Plaintiffs' medical expenses was provided to Defendant 
State Farm through Plaintiffs' treating physicians. (R. 19-20). 
6. Defendant State Farm hired Defendant Stephen P. Marble, M.D. to examine 
Plaintiff Marian Tucker, and he contended, in a report dated October 22, 1996 that 
Marian Tucker's care immediately after the accident was "appropriate and necessary," but 
that the subsequent chiropractic care was related to a "preexisting condition of lumbar 
scoliosis." See Exhibit A. Dr. Marble also speculated (i.e., he did not affirm to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty and he presented no foundation for his purported 
"finding") that Marian Tucker might have sustained injury or aggravation in her job as a 
clerk at a book store. Id 
2
 State Farm's insurance policy does not distinguish between PIP coverage which 
is required to conform to the no-fault statute and excess coverage limits. State Farm 
could conceivably provide this excess coverage and include clear and explicit language 
limiting an insured's recovery of medical expenses in excess of the statutory minimum. 
However, it has failed to do so. The excess coverage (up to $100,000 limits) would be 
medical expense coverage (like the old med pay system), not PIP coverage. 
5 
7. Plaintiff Marian Tucker was referred by her chiropractor, Dr. Dan Guthrie, to 
Dennis J. Wyman, M.D. who examined Mrs. Tucker on or about January 27, 1997 and 
advised Dr. Guthrie that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Tucker were "directly related to the 
accident of August 1994 and he "believe[d] she would remain asymptomatic at this point 
had it not been for the accident." See Exhibit B. 
8. Defendant State Farm hired Defendant Stephen P. Marble, M.D. to examine 
Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker, and he contended, in a report dated October 22, 1996 that 
DeeVoy Tucker's injuries were related to the accident, but that he had reached 
•"maximum medical improvement"3 by June 1996 and x-rays taken March 1, 1996 by Mr. 
Tucker's chiropractor were duplicative of x-rays taken August 5, 1994 by FHP; therefore, 
Dr. Marble advised State Farm to refuse to pay for the "unnecessary" x-rays and any 
treatment received after June 1996. See Exhibit C. 
9. Defendant State Farm refused to consider the contrary opinion of Dr. Wyman; 
rather it failed to pay anything on behalf of Plaintiff Marian Tucker and refused to pay 
more than $2,479.00 of Plaintiff DeeVoy Tucker's medical bills. See Exhibit D. 
10. Subsequently, Plaintiffs retained legal counsel to assist them in their 
personal injury claims against the tortfeasor and, on or about September 18, 1997, State 
Farm finally notified Plaintiffs' legal counsel that it plainly and unequivocally refused to 
pay the PIP benefits due to Plaintiffs on the basis of Defendant Stephen P. Marble's 
3
 Plaintiffs have alleged that this opinion was premised on the MERCY guidelines 
which are relied upon by State Farm's claims adjustors but not disclosed to insureds. See 
Exhibit I. 
6 
interpretation of Plaintiffs' insurance policy. (R. 20). 
11. Plaintiffs retained counsel to assist them in recovering the PIP benefits to 
which they were due and filed their Amended Complaint adding State Farm as a 
Defendant on or about September 12, 2000. (R. 16). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The no-fault statute is not horribly complicated: If an insured suffers losses that 
his or her doctor attributes to a covered event, the PIP carrier pays the insured's incurred 
expenses subject only to the reasonable value of the services or accommodations (as 
defined in the Relative Value Study), the $3,000 coverage limit, and the seven 
permissible exclusions. There is nothing else to it. 
State Farm sort of admits that the term "necessary" is not a permissible exclusion. 
However, its refusal to pay PIP benefits (relying on its doctor's opinion of 
"unnecessariness") is, in fact, an exclusionary act. The proof of loss requirement does not 
include medical-opinion-unanimity. State Farm relies upon its insurance doctor's opinion 
to limit the insureds' PIP benefits, and the only asserted statutory basis is the term 
"necessary." Therefore, State Farm's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, State 
Farm does, in fact, "exclude" the amounts of PIP benefits it doctor disagrees with based 
upon nothing but the "predicate" term "necessary." 
The undefined and standardless web of half-truths and allegedly-fashionable 
banalities supporting State Farm's assertions is horribly confusing. State Farm mixes 
7 
analytically distinct concepts and creates unnecessary havoc. Instead of quick and sure 
reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses, State Farm desires slow and equally-sure 
litigation. State Farm's interpretation would open a Pandora's box of contention 
transforming the substitute remedy for the abrogation of a person's constitutional right to 
bring a claim against a tortfeasor (i.e., insurance) into a split cause of action forcing an 
injured person to fight two separate fronts against formidable foes: (1) against his own 
insurance company for minimal PIP benefits (without the benefit of any standards for the 
fight); and (2) against the tortfeasor's insurance company for damages awarded under a 
negligence cause of action. 
Because the no-fault statute does not provide a "reasonable and necessary" 
exclusion, "predicate," or other clause (regardless of State Farm's vacillating 
nomenclature), it is hardly surprising that there is no caselaw explaining the non-existent, 
and incomprehensible, obstacle to an insured's recovery of contractual PIP benefits. 
There is, however, abundant caselaw and unambiguous statutory provisions 
explaining that payment of "all expenses" is to be "quick," "expeditious," "prompt," 
"efficient," "equitable" and "made within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of 
expenses incurred." State Farm has a nondelegable duty to provide indemnification 
against claims made by third parties who have provided services the need for which arose 
out of an insured event — in the opinion of the treating doctor. The insurer cannot simply 
buy the second opinion of an insurance doctor without an explicit coverage exclusion 
permitting a PIP carrier to thereby limit its liability. 
8 
Clinging to the single ambiguous statutory term "necessary" with white-knuckled 
tenacity is not a reasoned response or a logical justification for State Farm's bald refusal 
to pay the amount of the expenses incurred by Plaintiffs as required by the unambiguous 
edict set forth in Section 309. The term "necessary" is neither an exclusion nor a 
"predicate." As a "predicate" to State Farm's theory, the Court would have to rule that 
the no-fault statute "implicitly" places the responsibility on individual insureds to 
second-guess their medical providers. Such a burden is as impractical as it is unfair. The 
legislature has not, either expressly or implicitly, included this requirement in the no-fault 
statute. 
The term "necessary" does have meaning. It is part of the proof of loss 
requirement, and that requirement was satisfied by Plaintiffs' presentation of "reasonable 
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" pursuant to Section 309. Plaintiffs' 
doctors affirmed that the medical treatments they prescribed and billed their patients for 
were "necessary." Nothing more is required. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PIP COVERAGE IS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE FOR THE 
INCURRING OF EXPENSES. 
PIP coverage is a type of "expense policy." See, e.g.. Wulffenstein v. Deseret 
Mutual Benefit Assoc. 611 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) ("Throughout the description of 
benefits accorded, references are to types and amounts of charges, not to the cause of 
such expenses."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(5)(a) ("Payment of the benefits 
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provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are 
incurred.") (emphasis added). State Farm insists, however, that PIP coverage is an 
illusory promise creating its reciprocal obligation4 only when its doctor subjectively 
agrees with all of the treating physician's opinions about what treatment was "necessary." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307(l)(a) provides that injured motorists are entitled 
to recover, from their own insurer, "the reasonable value[5] of all expenses for necessary 
medical" treatment. Id. State Farm simply emphasizes the second word "reasonable" 
(while diligently ignoring its status as a defined term), injects6 the conjunction "and," and 
combines them with the eighth word "necessary." It, thus, claims that this so-called test 
(which it declines to define or explain7) "implicitly" permits it to deny payment of PIP 
4
 State Farm's analysis would transform it from an insurance company into an 
entity that receives premium payments in exchange for accepting little or no risk. 
5
 "Reasonable value" is a defined term which references the Insurance 
Commissioner's relative value study ("RVS"). Therefore, State Farm's "reasonable and 
necessary" assertions are misleading for that reason alone. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' refer 
to "reasonable and necessary" throughout this Brief for the sake of consistency. 
6
 "We will not insert words into a policy under the guise of interpretation . . . . " 
Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989). 
7
 The assertions made by State Farm are essentially "causation" type arguments. 
In tort law, causation is whatever the judicial system deems a sufficient contribution to an 
event such that legal consequences should attach. In contract law, causation is whatever 
the contract defines it to be. One commentator notes that language of causation is simple, 
but it disguises extremely complex and difficult legal questions. See Robert H. Jerry II, 
Understanding Insurance Law, § 67[a] (2d ed. 1996); see also Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15, 22-27 (Utah 1986) (reviewing the standards, measures of proof, 
burdens of proof, and procedural safeguards regarding "causation" under the Workers' 
Compensation Act). 
10 
benefits to insureds who have incurred medical expenses while ignoring its obligation to 
indemnify its insureds for "all expenses . . . within 30 days." (R. 132). 
Defendant's emphasis of only certain words in the statute ignores a 
fundamental principle of statutory construction, that "terms of a 
statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a 
piecemeal fashion." 
Business Aviation of South Dakota, Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 
1994). 
The word "necessary" is not defined8 in the no-fault statute. It can hardly be 
doubted that the word "necessary" is ambiguous. (R. 282). The word must, therefore, be 
interpreted in the light most favorable to coverage9 which means that the only restriction 
on the scope of coverage is that reasonable expenses must be incurred in good faith. 
8
 The word "necessary" cannot be defined as "indispensable" in a remedial statute. 
Fleming v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co., 38 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D.Pa. 1941). "Medically 
necessary" has been defined by the legislature and administrative agencies in many 
different ways and "utilization reviews" have been regulated. See (R. 287-88 at n. 27). 
9
 This statement is not completely true because the no-fault statute, as a whole, is 
not ambiguous because it clearly and unequivocally requires PIP carriers to pay PIP 
benefits within 30 days of receiving notice that expenses were "incurred." The statement 
is an acceptable generalization of the "ambiguity principle" or the doctrine of "contra 
proferentem" as a retort to State Farm's binary logic and piecemeal statutory analysis 
which consists of nothing more than the comparison of an adjective ("necessary") with its 
antonym ("not necessary"). 
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II. STATE FARM'S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFFS WAS 
TRIGGERED AT THE TIME IT LEARNED THAT EXPENSES 
HAD BEEN "INCURRED." 
The level of proof ° necessary to demonstrate an insured's entitlement to receive 
PIP benefits is "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during 
the period." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(b). This Court must note that the 
insured is not required to prove that the expenses were "related to" the covered accident 
or that the expenses incurred were also "reasonable and necessary." The legislature 
omitted these terms advisedly. Requiring preponderance-of-the-evidence-type-proof of 
"causation" or "reasonableness and necessity" to determine the amount of PIP benefits to 
which an insured is entitled would defy the policy purposes of the no-fault statute which 
is "prompt" and "efficient" payment of PIP benefits on a "monthly [basis] so that 
claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses."11 Versluis v. Guaranty National 
10
 State Farm confuses the "coverage" requirement and the proof of loss 
requirement. "In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction 
between a 'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right may be established 
or enforced. This fundamental distinction between the loss, in fact, being within 
coverage, and the manner by which the insured goes about establishing this to the 
insurer's satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency . . . . " Couch on 
Insurance 3d, §193:19. State Farm refuses to disclose HOW its insureds can prove 
entitlement to PIP benefits to its satisfaction. It is no answer to say, as it does, "We dare 
you to sue us, and if you do, we'll use our economic might to attempt to crush you." 
11
 State Farm's assertions would force this Court to conclude that the no-fault 
statute is intended to compel the plaintiff to bring a separate action against his or her 
insurer and to allow the same tort issues brought against the tortfeasor to be tried de novo. 
If a separate action proving "reasonable and necessary" by a "preponderance of the 
evidence" must be subsequently brought against a PIP carrier under the provisions of an 
insurance policy, then that holding will put plaintiffs to the unnecessary expense of 
12 
Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). An insurance system partially supplanted12 the common 
law tort system. This insurance system is designed to partially avoid13 the costs and 
difficulties inherent in the tort system14 and to direct scarce resources toward healing 
having two lawsuits instead of one even though the identical issues will be raised in the 
second action as are litigated in the first. If this is true, then PIP carriers should routinely 
be named as co-defendants with the tortfeasor in about 20% of all personal injury 
litigation (which, of course, would be prohibited by "the way it has always been done" 
despite the plain language of Utah R. Evid. 411). 
12
 Utah's no-fault statute has been described as a "partial tort exemption" statute 
while other states have adopted "true no-fault" and still others have adopted "add-on" 
statutes. These fundamental distinctions are lost on State Farm which initiated its 
"medical management" techniques nationwide with reference to its potential windfall 
rather than investigating the requirements of the different statutes in different states. 
While the district court stated that it agreed with the Maryland court's analysis relied 
upon by State Farm, State Farm made no effort to set forth the substance of Maryland 
law. Transcript at p. 56. While the sentiments expressed by Maryland's court might be a 
decent policy choice, it is not the policy choice adopted by the Utah legislature in 1974 
(i.e., before the invention of "medical management" techniques). 
13
 The no-fault statute provides partial tort immunity subject to the no-fault 
threshold. This is not unlike previous versions of the workers' compensation act. See 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) 
(explaining that the parties' competing interests were balanced by the legislative 
enactment of a two-tiered payment system requiring a "definite limitation of $1,283.38 as 
the maximum award for any 'ordinary' case" and "vests the commission with continuing 
supervision and control, which can be invoked as either party may find it necessary, to 
make determinations as to the causal relationship, necessity, reasonableness and justice 
of any extended award."). Under the no-fault statute, by contrast, the legislature left tort 
law to deal with "extended awards" and created PIP benefits to deal with "ordinary" 
cases. 
14
 PIP coverage "is based upon contract rather than tort principles." King v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (quoting In re Spera. 713 P.2d 1155, 
1156 (Wyo. 1986) (interpreting the workers' compensation act)). 
Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be 
denied benefits unless a provision in the statutory contract 
between the [insured motorist], the state, and the [PIP carrier] 
13 
injured motorists rather than paying scarce funds to lawyers, insurance doctors and other 
parasites. 
The "trigger of coverage"15 giving rise to an insurer's obligation to provide its 
reciprocal contractual obligations varies depending on the type of insurance coverage 
being analyzed. Indemnification under liability coverage is only required for the 
insured's "legal liability." Similarly, uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured 
motorist coverage rely on essentially the same trigger which is usually phrased as "the 
'legally entitled to recover' criterion" under which "Utah law requires [the insured to 
have] a viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law" against the 
uninsured or underinsured motorist. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.. 927 P.2d 
192, 195 (Utah App. 1996). The primary distinction between UM and UIM coverage, on 
one hand, and liability coverage, on the other, is the relationship between the insurer and 
its insured. Under liability coverage, the insurer "stands in the shoes"16 of the insured. 
Under UM and UIM coverages, the insurer takes an adversarial position against the 
insured and "stands in the shoes" of the tortfeasor. 
explicitly suspends the benefits. 
Id; see also Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985) ("Public 
policy requires that persons purchasing [no-fault] policies are entitled to be informed, in 
writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially exclusionary terms."). 
15
 This appeal focuses mainly on the "scope of coverage." 
16
 This phrase is so hackneyed and misunderstood that its value hovers near zero; 
however, it works in this circumstance. 
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The trigger for PIP coverage is most analogous to "litigation coverage"17 or what is 
frequently referred to as the duty to defend. Neither coverage creates an adversarial 
relationship; instead, they are geared toward serving the insured.18 The duty to defend 
requires the insurer to pay attorneys enormous sums of money on behalf of its insured 
"even if the allegations in a suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent." Deseret Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Assoc, v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986). 
In other words, the trigger is the filing of a lawsuit by an adversary against the insured. 
The liability carrier's defense obligation is triggered by the whim of the enemy. In 
contrast, the PIP carrier's obligations are triggered by the treatments and medical 
decisions of a physician who (like the PIP carrier itself) owes the highest duties good 
faith19 to the injured insured. 
17
 Liability coverage and litigation coverage are usually lumped together for 
purposes of assessing premiums, but they are analytically distinct coverages. 
18
 The flow of the benefits would lead most people to agree that the duty to defend 
is a "first-party" coverage and liability coverage is a "third-party" coverage. Bad faith in 
connection both types of coverage is undoubtedly "third-party" bad faith. This is true 
even though both types of coverage arise out of "first-party" contracts (otherwise the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing does not exist). PIP coverage possesses elements of "first-
party" coverage and "third-party" coverage. Its overall structure gives rise to a cause of 
action against the other party to the "first-party" contract for "third-party" bad faith. See 
POINT VI, infra. 
19
 Justice Cardozo's famous statement is relevant at this point: "Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a work-a-day world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden 
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of 
the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending 
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of 
15 
Of course, a liability carrier may not obtain an Independent Legal Examination 
("I.L.E.")20 from some shill-with-a-law-degree who obediently determines that the 
claimant's allegations are invalid and, thereby, escape its duty to defend. This is true 
because the insurer "stands in the shoes" of the insured. This is also true because 
timeliness is the essence of the bargain between the parties. A PIP carrier's obligations 
are similarly unaffected by predictable opinions peddled by insurance doctors. 
The purpose of litigation coverage is to provide legal representation when it is 
needed in order to avoid default. The essence of PIP coverage is also timeliness.21 The 
PIP carrier "stands in the shoes" of the insured and must pay the expenses incurred by the 
insured and owed to third parties.22 PIP benefits are intended to provide compensation to 
insureds "when they need it." Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:1 (explaining that no-fault 
particular circumstances. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a 
level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by a 
judgment of this court." Meinhard v. Salmon. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
20
 "A person cannot avoid liability for the non-performance of its obligations by 
placing such performance beyond his control by his own voluntary act." Cannon v. 
Stevens School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977). 
21
 See Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992) ("PIP 
benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses 
and actual loss of earnings incurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a 
lawsuit. Unlike an award of damages based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are 
paid monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses.") 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
22
 For these reasons, among others, the relationship between a PIP carrier and its 
insured is based upon trust and is fiduciary in nature. Were it not so, the absurd 
procedure pursued by Pennington against his treating physicians would be proper. 
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systems were adopted nationwide because although the tort system is capable of 
providing compensation,23 it is incapable of providing timely compensation). 
Utah's no-fault statute requires that "all expenses" be paid within thirty (30) days 
of receiving "reasonable proof of . . . expenses incurred." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 31A-22-309(5). State Farm ignores the 30-day period rendering it of no effect. A 
prominent commentator on insurance law has described the "reasonable proof standard 
in connection with the 30-day payment requirement: 
Where a statute requires payment within 30 days after receipt of 
reasonable proof of loss and amount of expenses, it has been held 
that an automobile insurer could not require an insured to submit all 
supporting medical records before the 30-day time period for 
payment of personal injury protection benefits began to run by where 
defining "reasonable proof of claim" to include all supporting 
medical records would allow the insurer to have unilateral power 
to determine reasonable proof of loss thereby circumventing the 
insurer's obligation to pay within 30 days and obliterating the 
period. 
23
 State Farm appears to believe that PIP benefits are "damages." PIP benefits are 
not "damages." See Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980) 
(explaining that "the compensation provided for in the [workers' compensation] act is in 
no sense to be considered as damages for the injured employee" rather it "arises out of the 
relation existing between employer and employee."). However, it is much easier to 
collect damages than it would be to collect PIP benefits under State Farm's so-called 
"reasonable and necessary" test. See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah 1985); Promax Dev. Corp. v. Maxon. 943 P.2d 247 
(Utah App. 1997) (explaining that, because it is the wrongdoer rather than the injured 
party who should bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages, the 
standard for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for 
proving the fact of damages. Rather, to prove the amount of damages, the evidence must 
rise above speculation and provide a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, 
estimate of damages). 
17 
Couch on Insurance 3d §189:64 at pp. 189-75, 76. State Farm insists that it be permitted 
to exercise unilateral power to circumvent its contractual obligations and "obliterate" the 
legislative intent underlying the no-fault statute by hiring insurance doctors and chanting 
the incomprehensible24 phrase "reasonable and necessary." 
III. STATE FARM NEVER DENIED THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE 
"INSUREDS;" INSTEAD IT ASSERTS THE RIGHT TO 
UNILATERALLY CHANGE THE AMOUNT'OF ITS 
OBLIGATION AFTER ITS INSUREDS SUFFER A LOSS. 
The constructive condition precedent25 which must be satisfied by the insured prior 
to being entitled to receive PIP benefits is set forth in Section 308.26 The no-fault 
statute's insuring clause provides that a person is only an insured when "injured in an 
accident involving[27] any motor vehicle." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-308. Section 308 
24
 The district court asserted that "reasonable and necessary" is not ambiguous, but 
it refused to define it. See Transcript at p. 55. However, it is axiomatic that an insurer 
has no right to expect compliance with an uncommunicated standard. 
25
 After Plaintiffs have brought themselves within the terms of the insuring clause, 
they are "not required to show there was no latent causes, or other conditions which might 
have contributed to the result, indirectly or in part. [Their] duty is affirmative; [they are] 
not charged with the duty of negativing anything." Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. 
S o c 80 P.2d 348 (Utah 1938) (interpreting an accident policy). 
26
 "Personal injury protection provides the coverages and benefits described under 
Section 31A-22-307 to persons described under Section 31A-22-308, but is subject to 
the limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31 A-22-309." UTAH CODE 
ANN. §31A-22-306. 
27
 Instead of the binary logic relied upon by State Farm, a PIP carrier could claim 
that there must be some causal nexus between the injury and the automobile accident to 
prevent the PIP carrier from becoming a general insurer. Indeed, an insured must show 
that the injury "involved" a motor vehicle in order to bring a claim within the terms of the 
18 
does not provide a limitation on the scope of indemnity28 available to injured motorists. 
The scope of coverage (i.e., the amount29 of State Farm's obligation) is addressed by 
Section 307 and Section 309. 
State Farm has never denied that Plaintiffs were "insureds" under Section 308. 
Instead, it asserted that it may limit its contractual liability by refusing30 to pay for certain 
"unnecessary"31 expenses. This refusal could only be based upon the seven (7) 
insuring clause (i.e., to establish "coverage"). The level of proof required (i.e., the "proof 
of loss" or the procedure required to obtain PIP benefits) consists of the insured's proof of 
loss which may not be required to include more than treating doctor's opinion. 
28
 If State Farm asserts that the injured person must satisfy the requirements of 
Section 308 and re-prove "insured" status with respect to each and every medical bill, the 
PIP carrier would transform each bill into a separate claim. Of course, if each bill were a 
separate claim, the $3,000 coverage limit would apply to each and every bill rendering the 
coverage limit worthless and of no effect. Plaintiffs are tempted to accept this absurd 
interpretation to vastly increase the coverage limits associated with their PIP coverage, 
but cannot honestly advocate it. 
29
 In Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated on a somewhat related issue: "We have no disagreement with the general 
proposition that a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the obligations of the 
parties are "set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed." But to be 
considered therewith is the further proposition that the parties to a contract are obliged to 
proceed in good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with its 
expressed intent. A contract is not fatally defective as to price if there is an agreement as 
to some formula or method for fixing it." Id. (quoting Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 
600 (Utah 1962)) (footnotes omitted). 
30
 "The contingency having occurred, there is nothing the insurer can unilaterally 
do to alter the policy with respect to a loss that is already in being." Wulffenstein, 611 
P.2d at 363. 
31
 At best, the word "necessary" could be characterized as an "exception" although 
that distinction has little, if any, support in this Court's prior caselaw. "Reasonable 
value" can most appropriately be characterized as an exception which describes the 
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"limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31A-22-306. None of the permitted exclusions resembles State Farm's purported 
"reasonable and necessary" exclusion. 
IV. THE NO-FAULT STATUTE DOES NOT PERMIT STATE FARM 
TO EXCLUDE COVERAGE FOR EXPENSES THAT IT DEEMS 
(AFTER THE FACT) TO BE "NOT REASONABLE AND 
NECESSARY." 
State Farm asserts that a "statutory predicate" (R. 378) to coverage or an "implicit" 
(R. 132) right exists for it to refuse to pay PIP benefits. State Farm claims that it properly 
refused to pay what "it deemed" (R. 129) to be expenses incurred for "not reasonable and 
necessary" expenses because it is "only"32 (R. 378) required to indemnify its insureds' 
expenses which are "reasonable and necessary." (R. 378). State Farm insists that this is 
true because nothing in the statute (except for Section 309 which states that it "shall" pay 
within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of expenses "incurred") "precludes" it.33 (R. 
subject matter of the PIP carrier's indemnity obligation. "Necessary" is an exception in 
the narrow sense of requiring good faith treatment decisions by the patient and by the 
physician, but it does not give rise to the affirmative defenses State Farm claims to 
possess. 
32
 The word "only" is used in the no-fault statute, but not to limit State Farm's 
obligations as it argues. Section 309(2) restricts a PIP carrier's right to exclude PIP 
benefits to "only" the seven (7) listed circumstances. See McCaffery v. Grow. 787 P.2d 
901 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that the no-fault statute "prevents the insurer from 
excluding PIP benefits to its insureds except in seven narrowly defined situations" set 
forth in Section 309 — none of which resembles the purported "reasonable and 
necessary" exclusion asserted by State Farm). 
33
 The Utah Workers' Compensation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-111, 
expressly authorizes the use of "Utilization Reviews" and the standards applicable thereto 
20 
132) (emphasis in original). 
State Farm merges and confuses analytically distinct concepts. It is estopped34 
from asserting that Plaintiffs are not "insureds" under Section 308. Instead, State Farm's 
vague and ever-changing arguments, in legal effect, assert the existence of an exclusion35 
and its ability to prove every element of the undisclosed exclusion. Draughon v. CUNA 
Mut. Ins. Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (explaining that it is the 
"insurer's burden to prove coverage is clearly excluded."). The purported "reasonable 
and necessary" 
clause that [State Farm] relies on operates as an exclusion in that it 
are set forth at R612-2-26 of the Utah Administrative Code. Utilization reviews have not 
been adopted in the no-fault statute. Instead, PIP carriers must pay "all expenses" within 
30 days of receiving bills. 
34
 Page-limit constraints prevent a full analysis of the estoppel principle. Suffice it 
to say that State Farm elected to deny coverage and defend this litigation by arguing 
"reasonable and necessary." See also commentators' reviews of the Doctrine of Election. 
35
 "[T]he underlying purpose of exclusionary clauses such as the one at issue [is] 
to hold the insured responsible for losses it could have prevented by the exercise of 
reasonable care over instrumentalities within the insured's control. * * * Excluding 
coverage for certain losses, the prevention of which is within the insured's control, 
advances the objectives of insurance by reducing carelessness by the insured." S.W. 
Energy Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 1999 Utah 23 % 18, 974 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Utah 
1999). But see Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that 
a patient's reliance upon the opinion of the patient's treating doctor is not negligence); see 
also Jane L. v. Bangerter. 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992) (holding that sections of 
abortion law were not void for vagueness under Utah Const., Art. I, Sees. 1, 2, 3, 7, 25, 
and 27 for failing to give adequate notice of the precise nature of the prohibited conduct, 
even though the statute used arguably vague terms such as "necessary to save the 
mother's life," "grave danger to the woman's medical health," and "grave defects," 
because the "professional judgment" of the attending physician is an acceptable measure 
of determining the meaning of these general terms in a particular case). 
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reduces [State Farm's] liability. That clause, therefore, should be 
strictly construed. Under Utah law, an insurer must use explicit 
language if it intends to limit coverage by an exclusion. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) (emphasis 
added). State Farm's explanation is that if it "only" has to pay for "necessary" expenses, 
it does not have to pay for "unnecessary" expenses. At the risk of belaboring the point, 
State Farm's binary logic is not "explicit" and its interpretation of "necessary" as 
"indispensable" is not consistent with the "strict construction" of that word in favor of 
coverage. 
State Farm also asserted that Marian Tucker's medical expenses were not "related" 
to the accident because its doctor attributed her pain and injury for which treatments were 
obtained to a "preexisting condition."36 One of the problems associated with an insurance 
company's reliance upon an insurance doctor for legal advice is that doctors are not 
well-versed in the law. "Preexisting condition" is not a permitted exclusion under Section 
309 and it does not render injuries (to which a person is more susceptible) to be not 
related to a traumatic event which acts on the susceptibility. 
In Whitlock, this Court examined a coverage exclusion which explicitly limited the 
scope of coverage provided by an accident policy. See Whitlock v. Old American 
Insurance Co., 442 P.2d 26, 28 (Utah 1968) (interpreting an exclusion contained in an 
36
 As Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo explained: "Especially in the law of 
insurance, the rule is that, 'You are not to trouble yourself with distant causes.'" Bird v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.. 120 N.E. 86, 88 (N.Y. 1918). 
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accident policy). The insurer asserted that because its policy (which was not a statutory 
contract or a type of expense policy) explicitly excluded losses caused "directly or 
indirectly, in whole or in part from . . . sickness or disease," it was permitted to deny 
coverage. Id. The insurer argued that a disease was a contributing cause of the insured's 
death, but that argument was rejected by the Court because it would have transformed the 
company's accident insurance into an "illusion and acceptance of premiums [would have 
been] a fraud." Id. The no-fault statute does not contain an exclusion similar to the one 
set forth in the accident policy analyzed by the Whitlock court. 
State Farm is sure to glom on to a phrase set forth in Whitlock because the phrase 
would support its assertions if the reason for the rule were ignored and if the phrase were 
viewed by itself. The Court stated that "it is elementary that evidence of [causation of 
injury] may be explained or contradicted by competent evidence." Id. State Farm argues 
that it simply wants to be permitted to attempt to contradict the treating doctor's opinion 
to avoid paying PIP benefits and receive a windfall. State Farm will ignore the fact that 
the accident policy examined in Whitlock expressly provided a contractual defense 
regarding causation. It will also diligently ignore the fact that the no-fault statute 
provides no such affirmative defense because the emphasis of the no-fault statute is 
indemnification for "expenses incurred" and it is not overly concerned about "causation 
of injuries" to those with a preexisting susceptibility. It is also "elementary" that a 
contractual defense raised by an insurance company must be clearly and explicitly set 
forth by the insurer or else the insurer cannot rely on the purported "implicit" exclusion. 
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V. NEITHER THE NO-FAULT STATUTE NOR THE STATE FARM 
INSURANCE POLICY PROVIDES NOTICE OF, OR A 
DEFINITION FOR, THE "NOT REASONABLE AND 
NECESSARY" EXCLUSION. 
State Farm asserts, in effect, that its post hoc refusal to pay incurred expenses 
would be foreseeable37 by laymen. It argues, in essence, that its policy's use of the 
undefined phrase "reasonable and necessary" provides clear notice that insureds will not 
be permitted to rely on their doctors' opinions. But "the contract did not explicitly warn 
the insured that [State Farm], rather than the insured's physician, could determine if the" 
particular treatment was "reasonable and necessary" and related to the covered event. 
Carrao v. Health Care Service Corp. 454 N.E.2d 781, 788 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1983). (R. 
590). And "[i]n the absence of an explicit[38] statement that [State Farm] may make such 
37
 But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106(1) which exists "to ensure that the entire 
insurance contract is contained in one document so that the insured can determine from the 
policy exactly what coverage he or she has" prior to a visit to an insurance company's doctor 
for an after-the-fact review of incurred expenses. Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1993); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 
498, 501 (Utah 1983) ("The policy of the law is to prevent mistake or misunderstanding as to 
the terms of the insurance contract, or what in some cases may amount to sharp practice."). 
38
 State Farm argued that it has a right to an insurance medical examination 
(which is a general clause not set forth in the PIP coverage) "and presumably State Farm 
is going to do something with the information it gets." Transcript at p. 51 (emphasis 
added). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307(2)(d) (setting forth the "something" 
insurers can do with the results of the "ME"). The law of insurance, on the other hand, 
states that: "A fundamental tenet of the law of contracts between an insured and insurer is 
that 'insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured.' United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993). 
Under this principle, an insurer is required to strictly comply with all provisions that give 
an insured notice of the terms, conditions, limitations or changes to an insurance policy. 
See Majernicek v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 86, 688 A.2d 1330,1334 (Conn. 
1997) (stating when written notice is required, 'an insurer must comply strictly with 
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an independent evaluation, the insured is justified 'in relying on the good faith judgment 
of his treating physician.'" Id., see also Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Association, 365 N.E. 
2d 638 (1st Dist. 111. 1977) (R. 585): accord Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 
(Utah 1988). Treating physicians alone should be empowered to make determinations of 
medical necessity, whether that concerns treatment, testing or prescribing in the care of 
their patients. The legislature has, and this Court should, defer these intensely personal 
and potentially life-saving decisions to treating physicians and their patients. 
The district court's misplaced compassion for State Farm's claim of entitlement to 
a financial windfall is not the balance struck by the legislature. No discretion is available 
to ignore the express statutory limitation of State Farm's defenses. 
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PIP CARRIER AND ITS 
INSUREDS IS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP GIVING 
RISE TO FIDUCIARY DUTIES WHICH PRECLUDE A 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE AND GIVES RISE TO 
A CLAIM FOR THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH. 
"The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principle of inequality 
between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties 
over the other." Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965). State Farm 
promised to pay to medical providers "all expenses" incurred by the insured for medical 
policy provisions')." McCov v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah. 1999 UT App 199, P 
13, 980 P.2d 694 (emphasis added). Moreover, no legal "presumption" arises that State 
Farm may impose an unstated but "implicit" coverage exclusion based upon its doctor's 
unlawful practice of law and his faulty interpretation of the no-fault statute. 
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treatment subject only to the coverage limits purchased and the "reasonable value" of the 
expenses. 
While State Farm insists that its insurance doctor's "medical decisions" create its 
right to a "case-by-case"39 review of medical questions; in point of fact, this case does not 
raise "medical" issues at all — it raises "contractual" issues. Although Plaintiffs' injuries 
are the offspring of automobile accidents (which prior to the adoption of the no-fault 
statute would have implied the utilization of State Farm's tort-based analysis), this fact 
does not permit State Farm to impose its "brain children"40 on its insureds. 
State Farm implemented an undisclosed medical cost containment program (the 
39
 State Farm believes that if it is permitted to aggressively litigate each claim of 
$500 to $3,000 individually based upon complex "medical" questions and its insurance 
doctor's presentation of spectral evidence, it will, effectively, be required to litigate no 
cases. For once, State Farm is correct. Requiring a full-blown trial leaves the insureds 
with nothing more than a hollow, paper right. The existence of "medical" questions 
would render its capricious denials of PIP benefits "fairly debatable" (even though a 
fairly debatable defense should relate only to a debate of the insurer's obligations "in 
court" and should limit the insurer's right to a present contest in court and would not 
include a mere naked refusal to pay insurance benefits nor would it apply to contests to be 
waged thereafter) which, in turn, prevents any hope of full remuneration for the insured's 
out-of-pocket expenses. Although attorney fees are mandated by the no-fault statute, 
courts may well ignore the actual fees and award 3 hours of attorney time for filing the 
complaint despite the fact that filing the complaint bears no relationship to the debt 
actually incurred because of the insurer's misconduct. See Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. 
Co.. 20010298-SC. A person (especially a poor person) who knows that he will not be 
made whole by the court system even if he prevails, will not bring a lawsuit. 
40
 Andrew v. Ideal National Ins. Co.. 509 P.2d 367 (Utah 1973) (acknowledging, 
sarcastically, that unilateral self-serving conclusions made by one party to a contract to 
determine the terms and conditions thereof would be a "good, economic business 
practice, if possible and enforceable"). 
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purpose of which is to provide a $42.5 million dollar annual windfall to State Farm) in 
lieu of honoring its promise to indemnify its insureds for their expenses. State Farm 
presented its doctor's arguments as "independent"41 medical opinions. Its use of this 
misleading nomenclature leads average purchasers of insurance to believe that the 
insurance doctor is the equivalent of their doctor (or, at least, insureds do not understand 
that the insurance doctor is contractually obligated to help the insurance company save 
money and does not perform any "medical" role at all). Plaintiffs do not allege complete 
silence, but half-truths and concealment.42 State Farm's failure to disclose its cost 
containment programs, to disclose the meaning, if any, of its "reasonable and necessary" 
slogan, or to explicitly warn its insureds that it would substitute its doctors' opinions43 for 
the opinions of the insureds' treating doctors as a "predicate" to the denial of the 
insureds' claims violated Plaintiffs' trust and reliance on Defendant's perceived special 
knowledge of the insurance industry. 
41
 See, e,g., Obiter Dictum, a newsletter published by State Farm's home office in 
Bloomington, Illinois addressing State Farm's Medical Cost Containment Program which 
stated that "the key to winning litigation is to produce expert witnesses who can 
support our position." See Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, Civil No. 890905231, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, trial exhibits 
(emphasis added). 
42
 For example, State Farm's insurance doctors are "independent" of their 
physician-patient duties and their hippocratic oaths. State Farm's characterization is not 
wholly false, just incredibly misleading. 
43
 See Beaver County v. Home Indem. Co.. 52 P.2d 435 (Utah 1935) ("a trustee, 
whether public officer, receiver, guardian, or other fiduciary, who contracts to surrender 
his control to another [such as an insurance doctor], has made a promise contrary to 
public policy") (citations omitted). 
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State Farm is also Plaintiffs' agent and owes fiduciary duties44 to them with respect 
to PIP coverage. 
Wholly apart from the contractual obligations undertaken by the 
parties, the law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary obligation to 
their principals with respect to matters falling within the scope of 
their agency. 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted) (analyzing Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 
1967)). State Farm was obligated to pay the third-party medical providers directly.45 
And, of course, an agent such as State Farm may not enrich itself at the expense of its 
principals, such as the members of the proposed Class, or fail to disclose the standards 
underlying the non-performance of its duties. This is not a new concept: 
"The employee is duty bound not to act in antagonism or opposition 
44
 The district court and State Farm were both confused by the "first-party" and 
"third-party" nomenclature as used by this Court in its bad-faith jurisprudence. It is 
frequently asserted that insurers are "clearly" only liable for "first-party" bad faith 
because PIP coverage is "first-party" coverage. See, e.g.. Transcript at pp. 53-54. Bad 
faith denial of PIP claims is "third-party" bad faith arising from a first-party contract (the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing only exists between parties to a contract — i.e., it does 
not extend to third-party claimants). See, e ^ , Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). The "third-party" bad faith distinction relates to the 
obligations owed by the insured (i.e., the insurer which "steps in the shoes" of the insured 
and is obligated to indemnify the insured) to third-parties (such as medical providers) 
because the insurer's obligation is to protect its insured from claims made against the 
insured by third-parties and because PIP coverage gives rise to a confidential relationship. 
Liability coverage (a first-party contract, but third-party coverage) and litigation coverage 
(a first-party contract and first-party coverage) are the two types of coverage 
acknowledged to give rise to a "third-party" bad faith claim. PIP coverage is the third. 
45
 PIP medical expenses are almost always paid directly to the medical providers. 
28 
to the interests of the employer. Everyone-whether designated 
agent, trustee, servant, or what not - who is under contract or other 
legal obligation to represent or act for another in any particular 
business or line of business or for any valuable purpose must be 
loyal and faithful to the interest of such other in respect to such 
business or purpose. He cannot lawfully serve or acquire any 
private interest of his own in opposition to it. This is a rule of 
common sense and honesty as well as of law. The agent is not 
entitled to avail himself of any advantage that his position may give 
him to profit beyond the agreed compensation for his services. He 
may not speculate for his gain in the subject-matter of the 
employment. He may not use information that he may have acquired 
by reason of his employment either for the purpose of acquiring 
property or doing any other act which is in opposition to his 
principal's interests. He will be required to account to his 
employer or principal for any gift, gratuity, or benefit received 
by him in violation of his duty, or any interest acquired adverse 
to his principal without a full disclosure, though it does not appear 
that the principal has suffered any actual loss by fraud or otherwise." 
Tatsuno v. KasaL 259 P. 318 (Utah 1927) (quoting 21 R. C. L. p. 825, under the title 
"Principal and Agent," § 10) (emphasis added). 
Fiduciaries who breach their obligations or fail to disclose their misconduct to their 
beneficiaries are presumed to have committed fraud: "If the representations were untrue 
and known to be untrue [or recklessly46 not recognized as being untrue], the fraudulent 
46
 When this Court properly interprets the no-fault statute, State Farm will 
(undoubtedly) assert that its approximately twelve years of misconduct were "fairly 
debatable" because there was "no controlling legal authority." However, State Farm's 
confidential relationship with its insureds required it to refrain from "the deliberate desire 
to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect 
in the transaction, — that is to say, where there is an intentional closing of the eyes or 
stopping of the ears." Research Planning Inc. v. Bank of Utah. 690 P.2d 1130 (Utah 
1984). State Farm was required to understand the difference between Utah's no-fault 
statute and the statutes of other states, and if it determined that it could pursue its 
nationwide Medical Cost Containment Program under Utah law, it was required to bring a 
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intent is presumed." Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 75 P.2d 
669 (Utah 1938). "Where representations have been made in regard to a material matter 
and action has been taken, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, it will be 
presumed that representations were relied upon." Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n 
Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co.. 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983). 
After careful study and consideration we conclude that this 
presumption shifts the burden onto the confidential adviser of 
persuading or convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of the 
evidence that no fraud or undue influence was exerted, or in other 
words, he has the burden of convincing the fact finder from the 
evidence that it is more probable that he acted perfectly fair with 
his confidant; that he made complete disclosure of all material 
information available and took no unfair advantage of his superior 
position than that he exerted fraud or undue influence to obtain the 
benefits in question. 
Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.. 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956). 
Regardless of whether the insured's cause of action is based on fraud, breach of 
contract, or breach of fiduciary duty, the central purpose of the law respecting insurance 
is to guard against and to remedy exploitation of the power insurers possess over their 
declaratory judgment action. Instead, State Farm determined that it could throw out its 
bait and hope that the status quo swallowed it (i.e., plaintiffs' attorneys who, in response 
to State Farm's assertion that expenses are "not reasonable and necessary," provide the 
reactionary retort that they will prove that the expenses "are reasonable and necessary" 
rather than inquiring as to what that trite phrase is supposed to mean (which would be a 
perceived showing of ignorance)). The status quo swallowed State Farm's alteration of 
the no-fault statute (hook, line and sinker). To continue the metaphor, extracting the fish 
hook will require three hands and an industrial strength set of pliers, but this appeal only 
relates to cutting the line. Class certification and full reimbursement to all insureds who 
were victimized during the past decade is the only acceptable extraction technique. 
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insureds' lives and property. Yet State Farm appears to defend this case by implicitly 
demanding that the Court permit it to do what it believes to be correct without having to 
explain the justification for such supposed legal invincibility and omniscience. That the 
insurance industry is capable of amassing armies of experts and legions of lawyers to 
argue its case may not give rise to an inference of correctness, but rather the Court must 
draw an inference of mischief or the potential for mischief.47 As a fiduciary that asserts 
its right to look after its own financial well-being at the expense of its insureds, the 
industry bears the burden of persuasion, and the Court has a duty to reign in the industry's 
mischief.48 
VII. STATE FARM CAN REQUIRE ITS INSUREDS TO BE 
EXAMINED BY ITS DOCTORS, BUT IT CANNOT RELY ON ITS 
DOCTORS' OPINIONS TO DENY INDEMNIFICATION. 
State Farm argues that its insurance policy requires insureds to subject themselves 
to an examination by its doctors. This is true. Moreover, the right to demand an 
examination, standing alone, does not conflict with the express terms of the no-fault 
47
 Nowadays, PIP carriers are beginning to abandon the "IME" in favor of cheaper 
claim denials which are based upon what are sometimes called "paper reviews" or "peer 
reviews" which only involve an insurance doctor's review of the treating doctor's notes 
rather than a costly physical examination. See Memmott et al. v. Liberty Mutual et al„ 
Third District Court Civil No. 000905218. 
48
 "And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as 
shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and 
evasions for continuance of the mischief,... and to add force and life to the cure and 
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act " Masich v. United 
States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 191 P.2d 612 (1948) (citation omitted). 
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statute and is, therefore, permissible. 
However, denying payment of PIP benefits based upon the insurance doctor's 
second opinion does conflict with the express terms of the no-fault statute and is, 
therefore, impermissible.50 This Court has frequently acknowledged the legislative intent 
underlying the adoption of the no-fault statute. 
The intention of the legislature is hereby to possibly stabilize, if not 
effectuate certain savings in, the rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of the personal injury claims that arise out 
of automobile accidents, these being those not involving great 
amounts of damages. 
Warren v. Melville. 937 P.2d 556, n. 7 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Automobile No-Fault 
49
 Plaintiffs have never argued that State Farm is precluded from protecting itself 
against fraud and bad faith. It certainly could have alleged and attempted to prove that 
Plaintiffs' treating physicians' good faith treatments were "fraudulent." The district court 
worried about treating physicians who may be "charlatans." Transcript at p. 34. If the 
treating physicians are "charlatans" their potential victims should be the PIP carriers. A 
PIP carrier cannot simply seek a second opinion and thereby expose its insured to huge, 
fraudulent debts owed to doctors (disregarding the risk that they may not be "charlatans") 
based upon its unfounded paranoia and incantation of the phrase "reasonable and 
necessary." If a PIP carrier truly believed that its insured's doctor was manipulating the 
PIP system, Plaintiffs have explained to State Farm how it should deal with that problem. 
See (R. 289-93) (setting forth the proposed elements of a cause of action against a 
"charlatan" doctor relying on UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-31-103). Instead of a reasoned 
response to any real problems of potential fraud, State Farm has committed widespread 
fraud and victimized its "good neighbors" to collect an undeserved windfall. 
50
 State Farm errs when it asserts that no part of the no-fault statute "precludes" its 
misconduct. See Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 265 n.2 (Utah App. 1993) 
(stating insurer's argument that the court should rely on policy language in determining 
when PIP coverage for lost earnings would begin "plainly fails" because "section 
31A-22-307 mandates the minimum coverage that an insurance company must provide"). 
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Insurance Act, ch. 55, § 2,1973 Utah Laws 141). Of course, under Utah's no-fault 
statute, cases which do involve great amounts of damages are still resolved under tort 
law.51 
In order to stabilize costs, the Utah legislature agreed upon the drastic solution of 
imposing price controls on medical expenses. The "reasonable value" definition limits 
the amount that can be charged for services and accommodations. UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-22-307(2). The procedure for identifying the "reasonable value" and the procedure 
for resolving disputes about the "reasonable value" are clearly set forth in the no-fault 
statute. Id The "necessity" of treatments or expenses, on the other hand, was not 
addressed. A procedure for identifying "necessary" expenses or resolving disputes 
regarding "necessary" expenses is not set forth in the no-fault statute. 
Instead, the no-fault statute requires prompt payment of the "reasonable value" of 
"all expenses" upon receiving "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses 
51
 The district court stated that "[e]ven insurance companies have a little due 
process." Transcript at p. 57. "Due process" to which an insurer is entitled is the ability 
to estimate its risk and to set premiums accordingly. An insurer is not automatically 
entitled to raise all defenses which might be available to a tortfeasor defending a tort case. 
PIP carriers receive premiums and can only raise the defenses set forth in their statutory 
contracts. This hardly implies any sort of due process violation. See Mead Corporation 
v. Dixon Paper Co., 907 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1995) (discussing the "independence principle" 
which is a contractual principle underlying letters of credit and which does not permit 
certain defenses which would hinder prompt payment, and contrasting that principle with 
the different contractual principles underlying guaranty contracts, which because of their 
secondary nature do permit certain defenses, and noting that "[i]n large part due to the 
independence principle, letters of credit provide a relatively reliable mechanism to 
assure the beneficiary of prompt payment[] if there is compliance with specified 
documentary conditions." IcL at n.5 (citations omitted)). 
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incurred."52 The statute does not include a clause which only imposes an obligation 
"unless" a third-party stranger to the contract expresses a subjective and arbitrary lack of 
medical-opinion-unanimity. (R. 298-306); Sullivan v. Barnett. 139 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 
1998); American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (noting 
that workers' compensation insurers were precluded from challenging "reasonableness 
and necessity" under Pennsylvania's pre-1993 statute which was nearly identical to 
Utah's no-fault statute's Section 309(5)). 
VIII. THIS COURT'S EXTENSIVE DICTA SET FORTH IN 
PENNINGTON vs. ALLSTATE IS WRONG AND MISLEADING. 
State Farm relies upon Pennington v. Allstate Insurance Co., et al., 973 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1998) for the proposition that PIP benefits must be "reasonable and necessary." 
However, the validity of the "reasonable and necessary" exclusion was not before the 
court. Subsequent to a bench trial, the district court made a factual finding53 that the 
52
 The inclusion of a specific measure of proof in a statute implies the 
non-existence of an "implied" exclusion negativing the measure of proof because it is a 
situation "where in the natural association of ideas the contrast between a specific subject 
matter which is expressed and one which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the 
latter was not intended to be included within the statute." Cullum v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange. 857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1993) fquoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 333, at 670 
(1953)); see also Biddle v. Washington Terrace City. 1999 UT 110, ^  14, 993 P.2d 875 
(stating that "omissions in statutory language should be taken note of and given effect."). 
53
 The Court should have remanded Pennington with proper instructions and an 
objective standard for determining the respective obligations of the insured and the PIP 
carrier (including relevant burdens of proof which are contingent upon an insurer's clear 
election to claim that its denial is based upon a condition precedent or a condition 
subsequent). In the absence of objective standards, the district court's conclusions are 
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insured "intentionally incurred unnecessary . . . expenses . . . in order to pursue a personal 
injury claim" upon the advice of his lawyer. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
principle that lawyers may be subject to Rule 11 sanctions if they advise their client to 
breach an insurance contract in bad faith.54 The holding is unassailable and is applicable 
to insurance company lawyers as well as plaintiffs' lawyers. That case does not stand for 
any other proposition. Bradley v. Pavson City Corp., 2001 Utah App. 9, If 44, Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13, 18 ("a case is only authority for what it actually decides.") (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
However, Pennington's broad statements and recycling of Allstate's bare assertions have 
presumptively arbitrary and capricious and, thus, clearly erroneous. There is no question 
that the plaintiffs attorney was wrong in many ways, but he was not nearly as wrong as 
Allstate's attorney. The sanctioned attorney's wrongheaded tactics seem to have been 
nothing more than knee-jerk reactions to the misrepresentations made by Allstate, its 
doctor (whose inadmissible psychological testimony about "undo [sic] concern" seemed 
to rule the day), and its counsel. Dishonest conduct should be more sanctionable than 
reactionary conduct. Moreover, the trial court purportedly found bad faith misconduct by 
the insured. Under the circumstances, the insured's actions would have been the breach 
of a clause in the nature of a condition subsequent. Therefore, Allstate still would have 
owed payment to the third-party beneficiary doctors (with a right of recovery against its 
insured for the amount paid). In contrast, where a PIP carrier alleges misconduct by the 
treating physician, it makes no sense to punish the insured twice for his or her doctor's 
alleged misconduct. The PIP carrier cannot simply victimize its insured based upon its 
assertion that the insured was victimized by his or her treating doctor. This basic concept 
of fairness has led some PIP carriers to include a clause expressly promising a defense to 
the insured for litigation arising out of its characterization of certain expenses as 
"unnecessary" which, of course, is never provided. This nonsensical promotion of 
litigation between doctors and their patients would presumably rely on the same faulty 
argument propounded by Pennington against his doctors (i.e., claiming that bills for 
services actually rendered are not actually owed based upon some strange and undefined 
"implied" covenant). 
54
 Its analysis must be translated as "bad faith" analysis because the Court used the 
inapt and incomprehensible "reasonable and necessary" lingo promoted by Allstate. 
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been "readily seized upon as pronouncements of this court and vigorously advanced to do 
yeoman service in cases of dubious worth. [Its dicta] plague the trial courts and the bar." 
Hess v. Robinson. 163 P.2d 510, 514 (Utah 1945) (Wolfe, J. concurring in the result). 
IX. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES MAY NOT BE RAISED IN A 
MOTION MADE PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6). 
State Farm filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) arguing the merits of 
Plaintiffs' claims and asserting that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. 
Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike State Faum's motion. The district court improperly 
granted State Farm's motion to dismiss and improperly denied Plaintiffs' motion to strike. 
The rule that affirmative defenses should not be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 
not an uncommon rule. 
Failure to file an undertaking is an affirmative defense not 
properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.55 
We note that affirmative defenses must generally be raised by 
answer. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah 1986). See 
also W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 
P.2d 252, 253 (1970) (the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), and is not a defense which may be 
raised by motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)).56 
Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we address the pleading 
and the procedure that led to the ruling below, because it raises a 
practice issue of general concern to the courts and bar. Had 
55
 Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6 at n.l (Utah App. 1994) (citing Hansen 
v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 840 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) & 12(b)). 
56
 Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon. 770 P.2d 1009,1010 (Utah App. 1989). 
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Golding timely moved, he would have been entitled to an order 
striking that portion of the motion for judgment on the pleadings 
that relied on the Act as a defense to any negligence claim. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that any defense shall be 
asserted in a responsive pleading. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that a responsive pleading must set 
forth any matter "constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." 
And rule 12(h) provides that a party "waives all defenses... which [he 
or she] does not present either by motion... or... in his [or her] answer 
or reply...." The Act certainly constitutes an "affirmative defense" or 
an "avoidance," inasmuch as it denies liability not because the 
allegations of the complaint are not true, but because the legislature 
is claimed to have relieved the irrigation company of the liability 
usually associated with negligence. Therefore, to preserve the Act as 
a defense, it had to be raised in the irrigation company's answer. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493, 493-94 (Utah 
1983); Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c).57 
State Farm did, indeed, provide case law in which the appellate courts have affirmed 
dismissals that were brought under Rule 12(b)(6) and which addressed affirmative 
defenses. The mere fact that other plaintiffs waived58 their rights and permitted 
defendants to bring 12(b)(6) motions in contravention of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure does not require or force Plaintiffs to waive their right to move to have State 
Farm's motion stricken and force their insurance carrier (who owes fiduciary duties to 
them) to conduct itself properly. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr., 2000 UT 72, 
403 Adv. Rep. 1, ^ f 19 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law in the 
jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to properly 
57
 Goldine v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
58
 Even constitutionally protected rights may be waived if a decision is knowing 
and intelligent. 
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assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in litigation."). 
X. THE UNDERLYING MERITS OF A CASE MAY NOT BE 
ATTACKED UNDER RULE 12(b)(6). 
State Farm cited Whipple for the proposition that it may attack the merits of a case 
on a motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) even though the Whipple court stated: 
In reviewing the dismissal, we must keep in mind that the purpose of 
a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the 
claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a 
case. 
Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) (citing 5A Charles 
A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). 
XI. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPERMISSIBLY TRANSFORMED 
STATE FARM'S RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION. 
The trial court transformed State Farm's Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 
motion even though Plaintiffs opposed the Rule 12(b)(6) motion by relying upon it being 
a motion dealing with purely legal issues. The trial court's act was unlawful.59 See 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (holding that a court may 
not unilaterally transform a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion). 
59
 The Court should not simply send this matter back to the trial court based upon 
the improper procedure employed by State Farm and the court. The trial court ruled on 
the merits of Plaintiffs' principal claim which was properly presented in Plaintiffs' 
motion for partial summary judgment. The Court must resolve the substantive dispute 
relating to the proper procedure underlying an insured's entitlement to PIP benefits while 
clearly admonishing the courts and the bar regarding the proper use of Rule 12(b)(6). 
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XII. STATE FARM'S INTERPRETATION OF PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT WAS UNDULY NARROW. 
State Farm based its Rule 12(b)(6) motion on its assertion that it may deny 
payment of PIP benefits pursuant to the alleged "reasonable and necessary" clause of the 
no-fault statute. Its motion ignored many of the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs' 
complaint. The unlawful nature of State Farm's purported "reasonable and necessary" 
defense was the principal issue, but not the only issue. Therefore, the district court's 
dismissal of the complaint was in error. Plaintiffs' allegations included State Farm's 
failure to disclose the alleged exclusion, its refusal to define or explain its actions or the 
insured's rights, its misrepresentation of the role and "independent" nature of its 
insurance doctors, and its self-interested coverage denials based on nothing more than its 
purchase of a predetermined opinion of an insurance doctor. 
XIII. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED PENDING 
STATE FARM'S FULL EXECUTORY BREACH. 
State Farm argued that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the 
underlying car accident. The court ruled60 that the statute of limitations began to run the 
first time that State Farm paid less than it owed, and the court ignored the statute's 
60
 While it is true that the district court's argument was better than State Farm's 
argument, the court's argument was both improperly presented and it was wrong. Human 
nature would make it difficult for a judge (or any person) to rule against his own 
argument. The adversarial system relies on an impartial jurist analyzing arguments made 
by honest and zealous opposing counsel, and "the interests of justice are not enhanced 
when the court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would 
otherwise be dead." Girard v. Appelbv. 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1983). 
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built-in tolling mechanism. 
The applicable statute of limitations61 for State Farm's breach of its contract is set 
forth at UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-313: 
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance 
must be commenced within three years after the inception of the 
loss. 
* * * 
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the 
complainant will arise from a delay in bringing suit against an 
insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay itself, no action may 
be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel 
payment under the policy until the earlier of: 
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as 
required[62] under the policy; 
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or 
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment. 
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which 
the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure 
prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the 
parties. 
Id. (emphasis added). Subsection (4) sets forth the "earliest" that a claim can be brought. 
That date does not necessarily define the "inception of the loss" because it only sets an 
artificial earliest starting point regardless of whether there has been an "inception of the 
61
 Statutes of limitations "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Myers v. McDonald, 635 
P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). Because this case only involves State Farm's refusal to pay 
actual expenses the proof of which was supplied to it, the policy underlying statutes of 
limitations does not apply. 
62
 State Farm argues that proving "reasonable and necessary" is some kind of 
"predicate" to entitlement to PIP benefits. This assertion estops it from asserting that the 
statute of limitations began to run 60 days from proof of loss. 
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loss" or not. 
The earliest that Plaintiffs' cause of action accrued was at the time of "the 
inception of the loss" and the date of the accrual may not be earlier than the date provided 
by subsection (4). State Farm's obligation was to indemnify Plaintiffs. Under traditional 
indemnity law, the cause of action did not accrue until the debt for medical bills were 
paid63 by the insured. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv.. Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 
19 (Utah 1990) (indemnity action does not arise when underlying damage occurs, but 
from time of payment of claim or payment of judgment or settlement). 
The district court ruled that the "inception of the loss" referenced State Farm's 
initial notice that it intended to rely on its doctor's opinion unless it received additional 
evidence (of undisclosed nature). Plaintiffs submit that a better reasoned result would 
follow the somewhat inapposite principle set forth in Davidson. 
The U.S. District Court interpreted the "inception of the loss" language in 
Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K&T, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661, 663-64 (D. Utah), affd 953 F.2d 
1391 (10th Cir. 1990) which was a case involving the insurer's alleged breach of its duty 
to defend. The court held that the limitations period accrued when insured began to incur 
defense expenses. 
63
 Without delving in to the underlying distinctions between "indemnity against 
loss" and "indemnity against liability" Plaintiffs will simply acknowledge the distinction 
and acknowledge that the underlying contract was more in the nature of a contract of 
"indemnity against liability" which does not require that the insured's debt be paid by the 
insureds before becoming entitled to indemnification. 
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Similarly, the Plaintiffs' "inception of the loss" was when they began to incur 
attorney fees for State Farm's breach (as contrasted with their negligence claims). 
Plaintiffs would not have incurred any attorney fees for the efforts of their counsel if State 
Farm had admitted that its refusal to pay PIP benefits was wrongheaded. Plaintiffs 
became liable for attorney fees (past and future) at the time they agreed to pursue this 
litigation. 
Alternatively, the "inception of the loss" for a PIP carrier's breach of its executory 
contract should be the based on the PIP carrier's unequivocal64 denial of "full" payment. 
The parties, by their agreement, were negotiating until State Farm positively denied full 
payment on or about September 18, 1997. Its prior denials were partially anticipatory 
breaches. 
64
 "An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests 
a positive and unequivocal intent not to render its promised performance." Cobabe v. 
Stanger, 844 P.2d 298 (Utah 1992). State Farm's denials of payment were always 
followed up with language expressing State Farm's willingness to consider additional 
evidence (of some undisclosed nature) which might lead it to change its position. 
The other party can immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as 
a breach, or it can continue to treat the contract as operable and 
urge performance without waiving any right to sue for that 
repudiation. 
* * * 
Our court of appeals recently noted, "A party that has received a 
definite repudiation from the breaching party to the contract should 
not be penalized for its efforts to encourage the breaching party to 
perform its end of the bargain." 
Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). 
42 
As for tolling,65 the plain language of the statute66 provided tolling. State Farm 
merely ignored67 the tolling aspect of the statute. Until State Farm unequivocally refused 
to provide its bargained-for performance, the statute of limitations was tolled. 
Moreover, tolling of the statute of limitations would occur regardless of the 
statutory language because State Farm is estopped from benefitting from its 
misrepresentations of its duties. 
In situations where a layman might give the controlling language of 
the policy a more restrictive interpretation than the insurer knows the 
courts have given it and as a result the uninformed insured might be 
inclined to be quiescent about the disregard or non-payment of his 
claim and not to press it in timely fashion, the company cannot 
ignore its obligation. It cannot hide behind the insured's 
ignorance of the law; it cannot conceal its liability. [68] In these 
65
 Plaintiffs realize they are presenting essentially the same argument for accrual 
and tolling of the statute of limitations. This is neither incorrect nor inconsistent because 
the statute of limitations argument is State Farm's affirmative defense. They are required 
to plead and prove their defense, and Plaintiffs resent the attempt by State Farm to simply 
assert the automobile accident as the "inception of the loss" in an improperly brought 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion and thereby shift its burden to the judge and to Plaintiffs. 
66
 "[State Farm] misses the point. . . . In the instant case, [State Farm's] . . . motion 
[to dismiss] was based on a statute of limitations that expressly contains an internal 
discovery ru le . . . . By its own terms, that statute does n o t . . . run ["during the period in 
which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure . . . as agreed to by the 
parties."] Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). 
67
 In oral arguments before the district court, State Farm asserted that there was no 
formal appraisal and no formal arbitration while it ignored the third option set forth in 
Section 313(5) which explicitly provides tolling based upon parties' agreement and 
pretended to misunderstand that the facts were to be viewed in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs. See Transcript at p. 53. 
68
 State Farm has not denied Plaintiffs' allegations that it has been mechanically 
denying PIP claims based upon subjective second opinions of insurance doctors for 
43 
circumstances it has the duty to speak and disclose, and to act in 
accordance with its contractual undertaking. The slightest evidence 
of deception or overreaching will bar reliance upon time 
limitations for prosecution of the claim. 
Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969).69 In 
other words, State Farm was obligated to investigate its rights and volunteer information 
about the insured's rights. Its "mere naked rejection" of the claim "constitutes conduct 
incompatible with the insurer's obligation to exercise good faith in dealing with its 
insured, and ofitself creates an equitable estoppel against the plea of the statute of 
limitations." Id at p. 588-89. 
State Farm has asserted that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy some "implicit" exclusion 
(which it refuses to identify or explain) or some "predicate" (which it refuses to identify 
or explain). Even in this litigation, State Farm has still refused to explain what evidence 
or proof would have satisfied it.70 Instead it relies on the "mere naked rejection" which it 
insists was permitted because of the insurance doctor's opinion. State Farm may not rely 
on its asserted statute of limitations defense. 
Lastly, even if State Farm's misconduct were viewed in the light most favorable to 
approximately twelve years. Its overreaching conduct has succeeded only because of its 
insureds' ignorance of the law. 
69
 This New Jersey case was relied upon by this Court in Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
70
 "One party [to a contract] may not render it difficult or impossible for the other 
to continue performance and then take advantage of the non-performance he has caused." 
Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah 1975). 
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it, it would still be contractually obligated to pay the PIP benefits to which Plaintiffs are 
entitled. At best, State Farm's misconduct has been the result of a unilateral mistake of 
law.71 If State Farm was acting under a mistake of law, it is nevertheless obligated to 
perform its contractual obligations. Its duty to perform under the contract is not affected72 
by the running of the statute of limitations, and its refusal to perform after learning of its 
mistake would constitute a new breach giving rise to a new cause of action. 
XIV. STATE FARM'S ANALYSIS WOULD RENDER THE 
NO-FAULT STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER UTAH'S 
OPEN COURTS CLAUSE. 
When the Court is engaged in statutory construction, it is obligated "to construe 
statutes when possible to effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid potential 
constitutional conflicts." State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005,1008 (Utah 1982). "It is also a 
well established rule of statutory construction that statutes 'are endowed with a strong 
presumption of validity; and should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any 
reasonable basis upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional frame 
work [sic].'" Murray Citv v. HalL 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983) (quoting Greaves v. 
71
 State Farm's mistake of law should not relieve it of anything. This is especially 
true because State Farm had a duty to know the law, it was perceived by its insureds of 
being capable of understanding the law, and relieving it of its obligations (by a de facto 
reformation of the insurance contract) because of its self-serving mistake would operate 
as a gross injustice to its insureds and give an unconscionable advantage to State Farm. 
72
 See 12 C.J. S. Cancellation of Instruments § 24 (explaining that the running of 
the statute of limitations relates only to the remedy available to the non-breaching party, 
but does not permit the breaching party to cancel the underlying instrument). 
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State. 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has analyzed the no-fault statute and determined that it 
is not unconstitutional under the open-courts provision of the Utah constitution. It based 
its conclusion on the correct understanding that the no-fault statute requires the PIP 
carrier to immediately pay all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by an insured. 
We further conclude that in the aggregate, Utah's no-fault statute 
provides individuals damaged in an automobile accident a reasonable 
alternative remedy [satisfying Utah Const. Art. I, § 11] because it 
(1) provides for recouping pecuniary losses by mandating recovery 
of all special damages, and (2) places a reasonable dollar limit on 
the general damage monetary threshold, to accomplish the statute's 
objectives. 
Warren v. Melville. 937 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997). The court noted that the no-fault 
statute might not pass constitutional muster if the victim were not permitted to recover 
out-of-pocket expenses, but the court affirmed that "Utah's no-fault statute does not affect 
a tort victim's ability to completely recover his or her pecuniary losses." Id. 
The statute does not interfere with a tort victim's ability to collect 
out-of-pocket expenditures^73] rather, it merely limits the ability to 
recover damages for pain and suffering. See Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-309 (1994). Additionally, Utah's no-fault statute does not 
limit a plaintiffs ability to recover for special damages, i.e., lost 
wages. See id. 
73
 Under State Farm's "reasonable and necessary" regime, a tort victim whose 
expenses were "deemed" to be "not reasonable and necessary" would have to have the 
right to sue the tortfeasor for the out-of-pocket expenses which were incurred (and thus 
recoverable under tort law) but not covered by State Farm's PIP coverage. The partial 
tort immunity provided to motorists who comply with the no-fault statute would be at the 
mercy of insurance doctors. But see C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479 at n.3. 
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Id. The no-fault statute would not pass constitutional muster under the open-courts clause 
if State Farm's assertions regarding the ethereal and undefined "reasonable and 
necessary" requirement were read into the statute to expand its exclusionary provisions 
and to constrict its requirement that PIP benefits be provided to injured motorists within 
30 days of receiving reasonable proof that expenses were incurred. 
State Farm argues that the insured pays it a premium for the right to a split cause 
of action against it when it breaches its contract; therefore, State Farm asserts that the 
insured has an effective substitute remedy.74 While it is true that the no-fault statute 
specifically provides for a cause of action against insurers, it contemplates a contract 
cause of action (existence of a contract, performance by plaintiff and non-performance by 
defendant). The no-fault statute does not contemplate the split cause of action addressing 
some idea which is stricter than proximate causation as proposed by State Farm. State 
Farm's proposed split cause of action is neither effective nor substantially equal in value 
to the tort remedy (with lower and clearly-defined burdens of proof) which was 
abrogated. 
State Farm's proposed remedy against it for its breach of contract is unworkable. 
Application of State Farm's tort arguments to a PIP contract is patently absurd. A jury 
cannot be instructed because there is no definition of "reasonable and necessary." State 
74
 There is no conceivable "evil" which might justify State Farm's split cause of 
action theory. Regardless, State Farm's theory is arbitrary. Therefore, the second prong 
of Berry need not be discussed. 
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Farm cannot even tell this Court whether it believes that its denial related to the extension 
of coverage or an exclusion from coverage rendering the burden of proof impossible to 
assign. The amount of damages available are insufficient to make the insureds whole 
after unrecoverable payments to expert witnesses (which one assumes would be needed to 
discuss State Farm's standardless euphemism). Bad faith damages cannot be assessed 
because the insurer diligently hired its insurance doctor to investigate whether 50 year old 
insureds might have had "preexisting conditions" or maybe its insured received an x-ray 
and, two years later, an "unnecessary x-ray." Attorney fees available in theory may not 
available in practice except for the preparation of the complaint. Moreover, the attorney 
might be sanctioned by the Utah State Bar (based upon its ethical opinion which assumed 
(correctly) that the insured's only obligation was the submission of medical bills) or by 
the trial court (relying on a faulty reading of Pennington's dicta). Nevertheless, after 
several years of protracted and expensive litigation, the insured might75 possibly get the 
$500 he or she was entitled to in the first place. According to State Farm, the purpose of 
insurance is not "to insure" but rather "to produce pointless and uneconomic litigation" 
under a statute which was purportedly adopted to eliminate litigation. 
75
 "A court of equity will endeavor, to the extent of its powers, to bind men's 
consciences so far as they can be bound to a true and literal performance of their 
agreements, and will not suffer them to depart from their contracts at pleasure, 
leaving the party with whom they have contracted to the mere chance of any 
damages which a jury may give. It will, therefore, in a proper case, enforce a contract 
by enjoining violations of the terms thereof." Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 340 
P.2d 416 (Utah 1959) (quoting 28 Am. Jur., page 270, section 77). 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court's order should, be reversed in its entirety. Judgment should be 
entered in favor of Plaintiffs stating that State Farm owes fiduciary duties under its PIP 
coverage, and it may not raise any defenses to its contractual obligation to pay PIP 
benefits (other than fraud or bad faith) which are not clearly and explicitly set forth in the 
no-fault statute. State Farm's unlawful claims adjustn lent techniques, its 
misrepresentations, and its failure to give notice of its actions to its insureds constituted 
breach of contract, third-party bad faith, and fraud. Because this case does not raise 
individualized medical issues, the district court should be instructed to certify it as a class 
action on remand. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of June, 2001. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
TRENTJ.WADDOI 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs / Appellants 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J~ & day of June, 2001, a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiffs' Appeal Brief was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Mr. Allan L. Sullivan 
Ms. Adrianne Goldsmith 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
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Exhibit A 
•Spine & Sports Medicine 
•Industrial Medicine 
Stephen P. Marble, M.D. 'Electromyography 
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (801) 565-6500 
October 22, 1996 
Mr, Julio Sandoval 
State Farm Insurance 
P.O. Box 30463 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84130 
RE: Marian Tucker 
File No.: 44-966-378 
IME No.: A-1911 
Date of MVA: 8/5/94 
Date of IME: 10/22/96 
Dear Mr. Sandoval: 
The medical records provided by IMES were reviewed thoroughly prior 
to this IME. 
SUMMATION OF MEDICAL RECORDS 
Accident Report 
Vehicle #1 is a 1987 Buick Century, with damage to parts 1 and 3. 
Estimated cost of repair is $100.00. Vehicle #2 is a Honda Civic, 
driven by Marian Tucker, with a passenger Dee Voy Tucker, with 
damage to parts 1 and 3, as well as 7 and 9 Estimated cost of 
repair is $350.00. Vehicle #3 is a Pontiac, with damage to parts 
7 and 9. Estimated cost of repair is $300.00. The accident 
occurred at 3500 South and 3600 West, with vehicles traveling 
westbound. There is no estimated impact speed given. 
Application for Benefits 
The patient complains that her lower back hurt, had a headache for 
several months, and was stiff and sore for a few months. The 
application was completed on 6/5/96. 
Delta Health Chiropractic Clinic 
Bills reflect 24 treatment sessions from 2/26/96 through 5/6/96. 
Lumbar x-rays were taken on 2/26. 
Western Rehabilitation Institute • 8074 South 1300 East • Sandy, UT 84094 • (801) 561-3400 • 1-800-888-3401 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
RE: TUCKER, MARIAN 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
October 22, 1996 
Page 2 
HISTORY OF PRESENTING ILLNESS 
Marian Tucker is a 42-year-old, left-hand-dominant female. She 
presents today with the sole complaint of low back pain, which she 
has attributed to the MVA on 8/5/94. In this accident, the patient 
was the restrained driver of a Honda Civic, which had stopped 
westbound on 3500 South when rear-ended. She saw the oncoming 
vehicle in her rear-view mirror and said "oh shit" before the 
impact. She claims there was about $400.00 worth of damage to the 
Civic, but goes on to describe* the accident having only dented the 
license plate. Her vehicle did remain drivable. Ms. Tucker 
recounts being thrown forward and backward in her seat and hitting 
her head on the headrest. She did not lose consciousness, nor did 
she sustain any bruises or laceration. 
Immediately after the accident, Ms. Tucker experienced neck pain 
and occipital pain. Her husband drove her to FHP Emergency Room, 
where x-rays were obtained. The patient was given a cervical brace 
and ibuprofen. 
Ms. Tucker began chiropractic treatments with Dr. Guthrie in 2/96. 
She claims that the hiatus in care between 1994 and 1996 was 
because she had been told by the physician at FHP she could expect 
to be sore for quite some time and it would take a while to heal. 
During the history, it became apparent that Ms. Tucker had long- yf 
standing low back pain stemming from lumbar scoliosis. It was very 
difficult to understand what the difference was in her back pain in 
the two years prior to the accident in comparison to the two years 
after the subject MVA. The patient says that she has also had to 
be very careful what she does, and that she has increase in her 
back pain with the slightest movement, such as flexion, rotation, 
or lifting. With chiropractic treatment between February and June 
of 1996 she has gained 50% improvement in her back pain. She 
experiences a needles sensation in the right low back about two to 
three times monthly, which lasts for one to two days. The pain 
will radiate up into the right flank and down into the posterior 
aspect of her right leg to the level of the knee. Lying down and 
chiropractic manipulation relieves the back pain. 
On further questioning, it became apparent that Ms. Tucker first 
noticed a significant increase in her back pain about two months 
prior to presenting to Dr. Guthrie (approximately 12/95). She 
denies any trauma in November or December, but the patient does / 
admit that she was working at the University of Utah Bookstore from * 
8/95 until 1/96. As well as her cashier duties, she had to do some 
stocking. 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
RE: TUCKER, MARIAN 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
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The posterior head pain and neck pain resolved after the MVA. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY 
Surgeries: Left breast lumpectomy, left foot neuroma resection x 
two, right ovary cyst excision. 
Trauma: None, other than the MVA in question. 
Ongoing Medical Problems: The patient has a history of scoliosis. 
She claims it"first became symptomatic with low back pain about 15 
years ago, after bearing her children. She received chiropractic 
treatment then, with improvement in her discomfort. 
ALLERGIES 
Benadryl. 
CURRENT MEDICATIONS 
None. 
FAMILY HISTORY 
Unremarkable. 
SOCIAL/FUNCTIONAL HISTORY 
Ms. Tucker was unemployed at the time of the 1994 MVA. She worked 
at the University of Utah Bookstore from 8/95 to 1/96 and then 
started work at Lockheed making copies. She has not missed any 
work at Lockheed due to MVA injuries. The patient does not 
regularly exercise. She does not smoke. 
PHYSICAL EXAM 
IMAGING STUDIES: Plain films of the lumbar spine from Dr. 
Plaskett's Chiropractic Clinic from 2/92 are of poor quality. They 
demonstrate lumbar rotoscoliosis concave to the right, with rather 
severe rotation of LI, 2, and 3. Dr. Guthrie's chiropractic x-rays 
from 2/96 include both cervical and lumbar films. The patient has 
anterior lipping of C6 and C7. The lumbar scoliosis looks about 
the same as it did in 1992. 
GENERAL: On inspection, Ms. Tucker has obvious lumbar scoliosis, 
concave to the left. The pelvis appears level. The 
patient has limited lumbar flexion and extension 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
RE: TUCKER, MARIAN 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
October 22, 1996 
Page 4 
secondary to pain. With lateral flexion, both right and 
left, the patient has pain localized over the right 
iliolumbar ligament. With palpation, she likewise has a 
distinct tender point over the right iliolumbar ligament. 
There is no tenderness in the sciatic notch. 
Dural tension signs are absent. 
NEURO: Muscle bulk in the lower extremities is symmetrical. 
There is no focal weakness with manual muscle testing. 
Sensation is intact throughout the lower extremity 
dermatomes. Muscle stretch reflexes are symmetrical. 
There are no long tract signs. 
IMPRESSION 
Diagnosis of Injuries Sustained in the MVA of 8/5/94 
Cervical strain, resolved. 
Preexisting Conditions 
Lumbar scoliosis, associated with chronic low back pain. 
Prognosis 
The injuries sustained in the 8/94 MVA have resolved. 
TREATMENT 
Treatment at FHP immediately after the 8/94 MVA was related to this 
same accident. Care was appropriate and medically necessary, to 
include the x-rays obtained. 
It is my opinion that the chiropractic care provided by Dr. Guthrie 
in 1996 is unrelated to the MVA in question. Rather, the 
chiropractic care is related solely to the patient's preexisting 
condition of lumbar scoliosis. Ms. Tucker first noticed a 
significant increase in her back pain about two months prior to 
presenting to Dr. Guthrie in 2/96. She had been quite active 
between August and December of 1995 at a job at the University of 
Utah Bookstore, where she had to do some lifting. The patient's 
increase in low back pain is more likely related to her activities 
at the University of Utah Bookstore than due to the MVA which 
occurred nearly a year and a half prior. Likewise, the x-rays 
taken in Dr. Guthrie's office were related to the preexisting 
condition. 
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No further diagnostic testing or treatment is required in relation 
to the MVA. 
The patient's current complaints are not related to that MVA. Ms. 
Tucker likely reached maximum medical improvement in regard to the 
MVA injuries by 1/95. She has not suffered a peirmanent injury from 
that accident and will not require any surgery for the accident 
injuries. 
Sincerely, 
^ ^ * C - - ^ 
Stephen P. Marble, M.D. 
SPM:ms5 
d/r/t:10/22/96 
cc: Toni Felice, R.N. 
P.O. Box 58003 
Salt Lake City, UT 84158 
Exhibit B 
January 27, 1997 
DENNIS J- WYMAN, M.D. 
175 West 200 South 
Suite 4009 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801) 359-7756 
Fax (801) 532-3900 
Dr. Dan G u t h r i e 
837 E. 2100 S. 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84106 
Re: Marian Tucker 
Dear Dr. Guthrie: 
Thank you for re fe r r ing Marian for a second opinion, 
a copy of my complete repor t . 
Enclosed is 
Overallf I believe she has made good progress under your care. She 
does have some sciatic nerve irritation findings on her right side, 
as well as some paresthesias on the left little and ring fingers, 
which could indicate disc pathology in the cervical and lumbar 
area. 
At this point, I did not recommend any MRI scans as the treatment 
would not change. Should her condition worsen, then it may be 
appropriate to get those studies. 
I would also recommend that she continue under your care in order 
to maintain her present state of health. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Wyman, M.D. 
DJW:jh^D: 01/27/97 15:47 T: 01/28/97 14:24 
Enclosure 
Dennis J. wyman, n.u. 
GENERAL INFORMATION: 
Patient: TUCKER, MARIAN Age: 42 Sex: F MR#: 
Physician: Dennis J. Wyman, M.D. Date: January 27, 1997 
CHIEF COMPLAINT: 
Motor vehicle accident with complaints of headache, neck pain, 
upper back pain, lower back pain, numbness in the left hand, and 
pain down the right leg. 
DIAGNOSIS: 
1. Motor vehicle accident driver (E813.0) 
2. Occipital neuralgia headaches (353.2) 
3. Cervical strain/sprain with possible disc herniation (847.0) 
(722.2) 
4. Thoracic strain/sprain, resolved (847.1) 
5. Lumbar strain/sprain with possible disc herniation (847.2) 
(722.2) 
6. Sacroiliac dysfunction (847.3) 
MEDICAL DECISION MAKING: 
Final Impression: All of the above diagnoses are directly related 
to the accident of August 1994. The patient did have preexisting 
scoliosis which had been present all her life. She had one episode 
of back pain briefly in 1992 which had completely resolved; 
therefore, I do not consider this to be an active condition. To 
the contrary, I believe she would remain asymptomatic at this point 
had it not been for the accident. 
Treatment: In the future, she should receive physical medicine and 
chiropractic therapy to maintain a present state of health. She 
may need MRIs of the cervical and lumbar spine to confirm disc 
pathology which is evident on physical exam, and by history. At 
this point in time, I would not recommend MRIs as it would not 
change her care. If her symptoms fail to resolve or if they get 
worse, then it would be appropriate to get MRIs. In the meantime, 
I would continue her on maintenance chiropractic therapy. 
PRESENT ACCIDENT: 
The patient was involved in an auto accident in August 1994. It 
was clear and dry. She was the shoulder/lap-belted driver of a 
Honda CRX that was completely stopped. She looked in her rear view 
mirror, and saw an impending accident from the rear. She gripped 
the steering wheel tightly and braced for the impact. She was 
pushed into the car in front of her. She remembers her head being 
whipped back and forth. There was minimal damage to her car. 
There was no loss of consciousness. Her seat back was not broken. 
She had immediate pain including headache, neck pain, back pain. 
The ambulance recommended transport by their vehicle; however, the 
patient refused and went to FHP Hospital by private vehicle. She 
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was examined there and x-rays were obtained of her neck. She was 
told she had a sprain, was given a cervical collar, ibuprofen, 
Tylenol with Codeine, and was told to go home and rest. She was 
told that it could take months for this to resolve. 
When several months went by without any help, she sought the care 
of Dr. Guthrie, who examined, x-rayed, and started chiropractic 
therapy for the patient-. She has responded quite well. She still 
does complain of some headaches, neck pain, numbness in the left 
little and ring fingers, low back pain with pain radiating down the 
right leg. 
She saw Dr. Plaskett in 1992 for some low back pain. She was 
diagnosed with scoliosis at that time. Her symptoms completely 
resolved under his care, and she was pain free prior to this 
accident. She had not seen Dr. Plaskett for several months prior 
to the accident. 
The patient's husband was also in the present accident, and is 
being treated by Dr. Guthrie. Presently he is on maintenance 
chiropractic therapy. 
History obtained from the patient. 
PRESENT PROBLEMS: 
1. Headaches: The patient's headaches have overall improved; 
however, she still has occipital headaches which radiate 
bitemporally. She denies having any throbbing component. She gets 
one to two severe headaches per month. These are controlled with 
chiropractic therapy and with over-the-counter pain medications. 
2. Neck pain: The patient has improved under Dr. Guthrie's care. 
She has severe neck pain one to two times per month. She also has 
some numbness in her left little and ring finger. She denies any 
prior neck problems. 
3. Thoracic spine: There was pain there initially, this is 
completely resolved. 
4. Low back: The patient is on maintenance chiropractic therapy. 
She has low back pain with pain radiating into the right leg 
posteriorly to the mid thigh. She did have some of this before the 
accident. She states that sitting, standing, and lifting will 
aggravate her low back problems. Under Dr. Guthrie's care, she has 
had decreased frequency and severity of back pain. She now sees 
him on and an as needed basis. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: 
Allergies: Benadryl. 
Medications: No other medications taken, except as noted above. 
Previous Trauma: Had remote motor vehicle accident without any 
injuries. Saw Dr. Plaskett in 1992 as noted above. 
Family History: Negative for major medical problems. 
Surgeries: Ovarian cystectomy three separate times. 
Previous Illnesses/Hospitalizations: Scoliosis. 
Social History: Does not smoke or drink alcohol. 
Page 2 of 4 
Patient: TUCKER, iw*RT*N 
Employment: Worxs as a clerk running a cofiee machine. 
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: 
General: No previous physical limitations. No prior disability. 
No abnormal sleep disturbance. 
Skin: Abnormal sensation. See Present Problems. 
Head/Neuro: Headaches. See Present Problems. 
Eyes: No photophobia, double vision, or change in vision. The 
patient wears glasses. 
Ears: No tinnitus, change in hearing, vertigo, or hyperacusis. 
Nose: No deformity, difficulty breathing, or sinusitis. 
Throat: No difficulty swallowing, change in voice, 
temporomandibular joint pain, dental trauma, or abnormal range of 
motion of the mandible. 
Respiratory: No pain with breathing, no shortness of breath, 
asthma, or cough. Has seasonal allergies. 
Cardiovascular: No chest pain, angina, arrhythmia, murmurs, high 
blood pressure, heart attacks, heart failure, or syncope. 
61: No change in weight. No peptic ulcer disease. No change in 
bowel habits. No abdominal pain or hernias. No GI bleeding. 
6U: No bladder or kidney problems. 
Endocrine/Metabolic: No diabetes or thyroid problems. 
Breasts: No tenderness, deformity, scars, masses, or previous 
implants. 
Musculoskeletal: See Present Problems. 
Psych: No prior psychiatric problems. No depression, 
irritability, emotional lability, phobias, panic attacks, 
reexperiencing the event, nightmares, social withdrawal. Life 
satisfaction has not changed. No decrease in self-worth. No 
excessive fatigue. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: 
Head: Nontender. No deformities or exostosis. 
Eyes: Pupils are equal and reactive to light and accommodation. 
Extraocular movements are full. Visual fields are intact to 
confrontation. Discs, arteries, and veins appear normal. 
Ears: Hearing is normal to speech. Canals and tympanic membranes 
are normal. 
Nose: No deformity or discharge. 
Mouth and Throat: Normal tongue. Normal elevation of the soft 
palate. Mucous membranes are normal. 
Neck: There is some muscle stiffness posteriorly. Flexion and 
extension are normal. Lateral bending to the left 40°, lateral 
bending to the right 40°. Rotation to the left 75*, rotation to 
the right 75°. There is point tenderness to the suboccipital 
region bilaterally. There is decreased sensation of the left 
little finger and left ring finger. 
Chest: Normal configuration. Nontender. Excursion is normal with 
respiration. 
Lungs: Normal to auscultation. 
Heart: Regular sinus rhythm without murmurs, rubs or gallops. 
Back: There is scoliosis evident on flexing the back. There is 
tenderness located over the lower lumbar area of the right 
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sacroiliac joint. Range of motion of the back is normal. Straight 
leg raising produced pain in the right posterior thigh, which is 
aggravated by dorsiflexion of the ankle. The patient does have 
difficulty returning to the upright position from the flexed 
position. 
Pelvis: Tender over right sacroiliac joint. 
Extremities: No deformity is noted. No swelling or skin changes. 
Range of motion is normal. 
Neurologic: Mental status: Awake, alert, with normal behavior 
appropriate to. the setting. Speech characteristics, content, and 
flow are normal. Emotional state is normal for the setting. The 
patient is oriented to person, place, and time. Cranial nerves II 
through XII are intact. Station and gait are normal. Cerebellar 
test, including rapid alternating movements are normal. For 
sensory finding, please see neck and back exams. Motor exam is 
normal for tone, mass, and passive motion. There are no 
fasciculations or tremors noted. Motor strength is 5/5 bilaterally 
throughout. Reflexes are all 2+ and equal bilaterally. The 
plantar response is flexor bilaterally. 
I AUTHORIZE MY NAME TO BE AUTOMATICALLY ELECTRONICALLY AFFIXED TO 
THIS REPORT SIGNIFYING THAT I DICTATED THIS REPORT. 
X: Dennis J. Wvman, M.D. 
(Dictated but not read) 
SDS:jh D: 01/27/97 15:47 T: 01/29/97 11:30 
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Exhibit C 
•Spine & Sport* Medicine 
\ 'Industrial Medicine 
1 Stephen P. Marble, M.D. 'Electromyography 
j Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (801) 565-6500 
October 22 , 1996 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
State Farm Insurance 
P.O. Box 30463 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130 
RE: Dee Voy Tucker 
File No;: 44-966-378 
1MB No.: A-1910 
Date of MVA: 8/5/94 
Date of IME: 10/22/96 
Dear Mr. Sandoval: 
All of Mr. Tucker's medical records have been reviewed. I will not 
recount the details of the accident, as they have already been 
described in Mr. Tucker's wife's evaluation. 
SUMMATION OF MEDICAL RECORDS 
Application for Benefits 
The patient describes injury to the neck. The application was 
completed on 6/6/96. 
Record of Prescriptions 
This documents prescriptions of ibuprofen in August of 1994, as 
well as September and November of 1995. Also included is a 
prescription for methocarbamol in September of 1995. 
Delta Health Billing Records 
These show bills dating from 3/1/96 through 5/3/96, associated with 
21 clinic visits. X-ray charges are documented on 3/1/96. 
HISTORY OF PRESENTING ILLNESS 
Dee Voy Tucker is a 56-year-old, right-hand-dominant Lockheed 
employee. 
This gentleman was involved in a rear end-style motor vehicle 
accident on 8/5/94. In this accident, his wife was the driver. 
Western Rehabilitation Institute • 8074 South 1300 East • Sandy, UT 84094 • (801) 561-3400 • 1-800-888-3401 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
October 22, 1996 
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Details of this accident have been previously described in Mrs. 
Tucker's evaluation. 
Mr. Tucker was the restrained front seat passenger in the Civic. 
He had turned to his left after his wife called out "oh shit" at 
the time of impact. He recalls his head hitting the headrest and 
his chest or clavicle being caught by the seat-belt as he was 
pushed forward. He did not sustain any bruises or lacerations. 
Shortly after the accident the patient developed a dull headache. 
He was seen in the FHP Emergency Room, where x-rays were obtained 
and ibuproferi was prescribed. He was seen back at FHP on one 
occasion due to persistent headaches and then told to perform 
certain exercises and massage his neck. 
Mr. Tucker first presented to the Delta Chiropractic Clinic at the 
first of March, 1996. He claims to have presented owing to his 
persistent headaches and neck pain. Chiropractic care improved his 
symptoms by 60-70%. 
He presents today reporting a constant fatigue in his neck, 
experiencing a sensation of a heavy head. He also experiences 
occipital headaches, which occasionally radiate up into the 
temples. The headaches occur daily and are aggravated by lifting 
and hammering. These same activities aggravate the neck pain. 
Ibuprofen relieves both symptoms as well. With heavy lifting, Mr. 
Tucker experiences aching in his clavicles. 
The review of systems is otherwise unremarkable. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY 
Surgeries: Two herniorrhaphies, vasectomy, partial gastrectomy 
secondary to ulcers, and repair of traumatic amputation of the left 
thumb, index finger, and long digit. 
Trauma: Motorcycle accident 30 years ago, resulting in extensive 
laceration to the right upper extremity. 
Allergies: None. 
CURRENT MEDICATIONS 
Ibuprofen. 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
October 22, 1996 
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RELATED PREEXISTING CONDITIONS 
Mr. Tucker denies having had any problems with neck pain or 
headaches prior to the MVA in question. 
FAMILY HISTORY 
Unremarkable. 
SOCIAL/FUNCTIONAL HISTORY 
Mr. Tucker has been employed by Lockheed for 37 years. He has not 
missed any work as a result of the MVA in question. He performs 
maintenance work for Lockheed now. The patient does not smoke and 
does not regularly exercise. 
PHYSICAL EXAM 
IMAGING STUDIES: Plain films of the cervical spine from 2/96 show 
anterolisthesis of C4 on C5. Normal lordosis is maintained from Cl 
to C4. From C5 down to Tl the patient has rather marked 
degenerative disk changes, with reversal of normal cervical 
lordosis and minimal to no movement at these lower segments with 
flexion and extension. 
GENERAL: Healthy appearing male of stated age, without gross 
pathologic deviations to his posture or gait. 
Cervical spine range of motion is limited to 
approximately 50% in all planes. The patient reports 
popping and grinding in his neck with rotation. 
Spurling's maneuver and axial compression does not cause 
radicular symptoms. 
There was no distinct suboccipital tenderness. The 
patient did complain of localized tenderness at the C4-5 
level with palpation and flexion. There are no distinct 
trigger points in the cervicothoracic or shoulder girdle 
musculature. 
NEURO: Neurologic examination was normal. There is no distinct 
or focal loss of sensation or motor function in the upper 
extremities. Muscle stretch reflexes are symmetrical at 
the biceps, triceps, and brachioradialis. 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
October 22, 1996 
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IMPRESSION 
Diagnoses of Injuries Stemming from the 8/5/94 MVA 
1. Type II whiplash-associated disorder. 
2. Cervicogenic headaches secondary to #1. 
Preexisting Conditions 
Moderately severe cervical spondylosis.' 
TREATMENT 
Mr. Tucker has taken nonsteroidal antiinflammatory medications from 
time to time, owing to his headaches and neck pain. Continued use 
of nonsteroidals due to the accident-related injuries is 
appropriate. 
All of the treatment documented appears to be related to the MVA in 
question and the care has been appropriate and medically necessary, y 
other than the repetition of x-rays in the chiropractic clinic, 
which does not appear to be necessary. X-rays had already been 
taken at FHP. 
Mr. Tucker will not require surgery for the accident-related 
injuries. Given the history relayed, it appears he has suffered a 
permanent injury from this MVA. 
No further chiropractic or physical therapy is necessary. No 
additional diagnostic testing is required in relation to this MVA 
either. 
I do not have any recommendations for alternative care. It is 
estimated the patient reached maximum medical improvement in regard 
to the MVA injuries by 6/96. 
No restriction in activities need apply in regard to the MVA 
injuries. 
DISCUSSION 
The cervical x-rays point to moderately severe preexisting cervical V1 
spondylosis. This patient claims to have been completely 
asymptomatic prior to the MVA in question. He specifically denies 
having had any neck pain or headaches in the past. I can't help 
but question his claim in view of the extent of degenerative 
changes seen on the x-rays
 r but in the absence of any evidence to 
Mr. Julio Sandoval 
RE: TUCKER, DEE VOY 
Independent Medical Evaluation 
October 22, 1996 
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refute this patient's claim, I am compelled to determine the 
patient's current symptoms are solely related to the MVA injury. 
On the other hand, the extent of injury from the whiplash is 
expected to be greater owing to the preexisting cervical 
spondylosis and the patient's age. 
Please let me know if you have any further questions. 
Sincerely, 
Stephen P. Marble, M.D. 
SPM:ms5 
d/r/t:10/22/96 
cc: Toni Felice, R.N. 
P.O. Box 58003 
Salt Lake City, UT 84158 
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41-12a-301. Definition - Requirement of owner's or operator's security - Exceptions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "highway" has the same meaning as provided in Section 41-la-102; and 
(b) "quasi-public road or parking area" has the same meaning as provided in Section 
41-6-17.5. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (5): 
(a) every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain owner's or operator's security in 
effect at any time that the motor vehicle is operated on a highway or on a quasi-public road or 
parking area within the state; and 
(b) every nonresident owner of a motor vehicle that has been physically present in this state 
for: 
(i) 90 or fewer days during the preceding 365 days shall maintain the type and amount of 
owner's or operator's security required in his place of residence, in effect continuously throughout 
the period the motor vehicle remains within Utah; or 
(ii) more than 90 days during the preceding 365 days shall thereafter maintain owner's or 
operator's security in effect continuously throughout the period the motor vehicle remains within 
Utah. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), the state and all of its political subdivisions and 
their respective departments, institutions, or agencies shall maintain owner's or operator's 
security in effect continuously for their motor vehicles. 
(b) Any other state is considered a nonresident owner of its motor vehicles and is subject to 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(4) The United States, any political subdivision of it, or any of its agencies may maintain 
owner's or operator's security in effect for their motor vehicles. 
(5) Owner's or operator's security is not required for any of the following: 
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Section 41-22-3 when operated either: 
(i) on a highway designated as open for off-highway vehicle use; or 
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 41 -22-10.3; 
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry operated in the manner prescribed by Subsections 
41-22-5.5(3) through (5); 
(c) electric assisted bicycles as defined under Section 41-6-1; or 
(d) motor assisted scooters as defined under Section 41-6-1. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-301, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1987, ch. 162, § 29; 1993, 
ch. 189, § 1; 1993, ch. 202, § 2; 1994, ch. 179, § 1; 1996, ch. 128, § 1; 1996, ch. 208, § 3; 1998, 
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ch. 245, § 5; 1999, ch. 350, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted the designation for 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) and added Subsection (2)(a)(ii); subdivided Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection 
(5)(c), which read "a motor vehicle that is not operated or moved on a highway"; and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 128, effective April 29, 1996, deleted Subsection (2)(a)(i) which read: 
"throughout the registration period of the motor vehicle; or." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 208, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection (5)(c) and made a 
related stylistic change. 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4,1998, added Subsection (5)(d), making a related change. 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, added the Subsection (1)(a) designation; added 
Subsection (1)(b), making a related stylistic change; and inserted "or on a quasi-public road or parking 
area" in Subsection (2)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Federal government. 
Liability of county. 
Federal government. 
Even if the federal government could be characterized as an insurer because it provided financial 
security for its employees in regard to vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory 
arbitration under § 31A-22-309(6), since this would conflict with the administrative arrangement 
established in the Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 
651 (D. Utah 1989). 
Liability of county. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehicles operated by permissive users, under former law. 
See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
A state employee who was injured in a car accident in the course of her employment was entitled to 
collect personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under § 31A-22-309 to the extent those benefits were not 
covered by workers' compensation. The workers' compensation exclusivity provision does not bar such 
action; moreover, the provision of the state's self-insurance program excluding PIP benefits to any person 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits is not in harmony with statutory requirements and is therefore 
invalid. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 160; 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 248. 
A.L.R. - State regulation of motor vehicle rental ("you-drive") business, 60 A.L.R.4th 784. 
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31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insurance policies - Exceptions. 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or 
operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304; 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived 
under Subsection 31A-22-305(4); and 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived 
under Subsection 31A-22-305(9)(c). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy the owner's or 
operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except for motorcycles, trailers, and 
semitrailers, shall also include personal injury protection under Sections 31A-22-306 through 
31A-22-309. 
(3) First party medical coverages may be offered or included in policies issued to 
motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. Owners and operators of motorcycles, 
trailers, and semitrailers are not covered by personal injury protection coverages in connection 
with injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-302, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1; 1992, ch. 
132, §1; 2000, ch. 1,§54. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Subsection 
31A-22-305(9)(c)" for "Subsection 31A-22-305(8)(c)" in Subsection (1)(c). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Liability of county. 
Uninsured motorist coverage. 
- Exclusionary clause. 
Cited. 
Liability of county. 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehicles operated by permissive users, under former law. 
See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
Uninsured motorist coverage. 
- Exclusionary clause. 
Former § 41-12-21.1, which merely required insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage and 
authorized motorists to waive coverage, did not require them to allow an individual to purchase insurance 
on one vehicle and obtain coverage on all the other vehicles in his household; a clause excluding such 
multiple coverage is permissible. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987). 
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A policy that covered the insured for any injury caused by an uninsured motorist, excluding therefrom 
only uninsured "automobiles" owned by the insured, did not exclude uninsured motorist coverage when 
the insured was operating a motorcycle. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Cited in Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 22 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 110. 
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of "no-fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 229. 
Injury or death caused by assault as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th 
1010. 
Validity, under insurance statutes, of coverage exclusion for injury to or death of insured's family or 
household members, 52 A.L.R.4th 18. 
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute 
mandating insurance coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
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31A-22-306. Personal injury protection. 
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the coverages and 
benefits described under Section 31A-22-307 to persons described under Section 31A-22-308, 
but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions set forth in Section 31A-22-309. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-306, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 158. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Combining or "stacking" of "no fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) coverages in 
automobile liability policy or policies, 29 A.L.R.4th 12. 
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31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, 
rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to 
exceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and loss of earning 
capacity per person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the 
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless the 
disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, for 
services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, 
the injured person would have performed for his household, except that this benefit need not be 
paid for the first three days after the date of injury unless the person's inability to perform these 
services continues for more than two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 per person; and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total of $3,000. 
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in Subsection 
(1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a relative value 
study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an 
injured person in the most populous county in the state to assign a unit value and determine the 
75th percentile charge for each type of sendee and accommodation. The study shall be updated 
every other year. In conducting the study, the department may consult or contract with 
appropriate public and private medical and health agencies or other technical experts. The costs 
and expenses incurred in conducting, maintaining, and administering the relative value study 
shall be funded by the tax created under Section 59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the 
department shall prepare and publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the 
75th percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. 
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined by applying the unit 
value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the service or accommodation under the relative 
value study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile 
charge under the relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation shall equal the 
reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of 
this state. 
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a schedule already 
established or a schedule prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the 
requirements of this subsection. 
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any patterns of overcharging, 
excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider within 30 days after such 
insurer has knowledge of such pattern. 
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of either party may 
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designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed physicians to examine the 
claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or 
expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection 
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a recognized religious method of healing. 
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's spouse only the 
loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the insured states in writing that: 
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse 
received any earned income from regular employment; and 
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the period of insurance, 
neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will receive earned income from regular employment. 
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance providing coverages 
greater than the minimum coverage required under this chapter nor does it require the 
segregation of those minimum coverages from other coverages in the same policy. 
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages required under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; 1989, 
ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991, ch. 74, § 7; 1994, ch. 71, § 1. 
Link to 2001 Legislation Affecting this Section 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Allowable benefits. 
- Household services. 
- Loss of earnings. 
Arbitration panel. 
Dismissal of claim. 
Time computation. 
Tort claims. 
- Availability of insurance benefits. 
- Motorist's liability. 
Allowable benefits. 
- Household services. 
The phrase "and regardless of whether any of these expenses are actually incurred" in former version 
of this section was included to eliminate the necessity of proving such expenses and to prevent the insurer 
from claiming the benefit of services rendered gratuitously by friends or relatives which otherwise would 
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have to be paid for; it did not require that reimbursement be made any time a family lost the services of 
one of its members regardless of the character of those services. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 
559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
Former provisions did not require insurer to pay the family of a twelve-year-old boy injured in an 
automobile accident $12 per day during the period of the boy's disablement as reimbursement for the 
value of lost services, which would have consisted of doing dishes, carrying out the garbage, washing the 
family car, and other similar chores because it was not reasonable to assume that the family would in fact 
have incurred expenses to perform the boy's chores, and so they were not entitled to reimbursement. 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
If a person is not "disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings benefits, neither is he "disabled" for 
purposes of household services benefits. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), 
overruled on other grounds, Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
The legislature intended to establish the mandatory household services benefit as an aggregate 
maximum of $20 per day of disability, up to a maximum of 365 days of disability, and not as an individual 
maximum of $20 on each day services are actually rendered. Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
- Loss of earnings. 
"Disability" refers to the inability to work; injured party who was able to work during the period for 
which disability benefits were sought and who earned more than $150 per week during the entire time for 
which benefits were sought was not entitled to disability benefits for loss of earnings. Jones v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Wall, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
A claimant who was unemployed at the time of his or her accident can collect disability benefits for lost 
wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a job was available for which the 
claimant was qualified and that the claimant would have taken that job. The legislature did not intend to 
provide compensation for "loss of earning capacity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and specific 
monetary loss. Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). 
Arbitration panel. 
Failure to arbitrate a claim before a panel was not grounds for dismissal of plaintiffs complaint. Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Dismissal of claim. 
This statute provides no basis on which to dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Time computation. 
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection (1)(b)(i) runs from the loss of gross income and loss of 
earning capacity, not from the date of the accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer loss of income and 
loss of earning capacity until six months after an accident and continued to suffer that loss for a period 
exceeding the maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly denied coverage when the trial court only 
provided for coverage for 52 weeks following the date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 
263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Tort claims. 
- Availability of insurance benefits. 
No-fault benefits are available to those who sustain serious injury even though they remain free to 
pursue a tort claim as well; however, the injured person is not entitled to a double recovery from the 
tort-feasor and under no-fault for a single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), 
see also Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 978 P.2d 460. 
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Where insured brought action against his no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault benefits after 
receiving benefits from the no-fault insurer and obtaining a judgment against a third-party tort-feasor, 
insured was collaterally estopped from recovering additional no-fault benefits in the form of lost wages but 
was not collaterally estopped from recovering for household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 
P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
- Motorist's liability. 
A party having the security required under this section is granted partial tort immunity and is not 
personally liable for the benefits provided hereunder; he remains liable for customary tort claims, such as 
general damages and economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold 
provisions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113. 
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of "no-fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.LR.3d 229. 
Validity of state statute prohibiting health providers from the practice of waiving patients' obligation to 
pay health insurance deductibles or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8 A.L.R.5th 855. 
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31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protection. 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, regardless of 
whether the accident occurs in this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or 
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own 
motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy; 
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are 
residents of the insured's household, including those who usually make their home in the same 
household but temporarily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1), 
except where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his own motor vehicle not 
insured under the policy; and 
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile accident occurring 
while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in the policy with the express or implied 
consent of the named insured or while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in 
Utah involving the described motor vehicle. 
History: C.1953,31A-22-308, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
Out-of-state incidents. 
Cited. 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Passenger in an automobile driven by insured's son but owned by another person was not entitled to 
personal injury protection (PIP) coverage under a policy covering the driver. McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 
901 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
The coverage described in § 31A-22-307 was applicable to an insured killed while riding a motorcycle 
involved in an accident in this state with a motor vehicle; there is no requirement that the insured must be 
operating or occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to coverage, but only that he be in an accident 
involving a motor vehicle. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981). 
Out-of-state incidents. 
In light of language limiting application of former provisions to accidents in this state, insurance 
commissioner's regulation making no-fault insurance coverage applicable to incidents occurring outside 
the state was in error. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975); Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 
(Utah 1995)overruled on other grounds. 
Cited in Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - What constitutes "entering" or "alighting from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or 
statute mandating insurance coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
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31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy which 
includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general damages 
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident, except 
where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may only 
exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor vehicle owned by 
or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of the insured and not 
insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle without 
the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured 
motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while 
located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or 
revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be contained in 
other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of an accident 
covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from the United States or 
any of its agencies because that person is on active duty in the military service. 
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(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, including those 
policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the motor 
vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a 
monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer 
receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof 
is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of 
the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid 
within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the 
rate of 1 1/2% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses 
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits 
and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under personal injury protection have 
been paid by another insurer, including the Workers1 Compensation Fund created under Chapter 
33, the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer 
for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by 
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; 1988 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, § 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1; 2000, ch. 222, § 
5. 
Link to 2001 Legislation Affecting this Section 
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Workers' 
Compensation Fund created under Chapter 33" for "Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah" in Subsection 
(6)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Constitutionality. 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
- Effect on insurer's obligation. 
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Accrual of cause of action. 
Attorney's fees. 
- Appeal. 
Claims against federal government. 
Construction. 
Household exclusion clause. 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
Pleadings. 
Reimbursement. 
- Recovery from insured and his insurer. 
Threshold requirements. 
Tort claims. 
- Liability of insured. 
- Pleading and instructions. 
Workers1 compensation. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The no-fault statute satisfies the open courts provision of Utah Const., Art. I, § 11, because it not only 
provides a tort victim with a reasonable and alternative remedy, but also eliminates a clear social or 
economic evil; further, it does not violate the uniform operation of laws provision of Const., Art. I, § 24, 
because it makes a reasonable classification between serious and less serious injuries. Warren v. 
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
- Effect on insurer's obligation. 
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an insured from a no-fault insurer does not terminate the 
contractual obligation of the insurer to make additional payments for subsequently accrued claims. Wilde 
v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
Accrual of cause of action. 
A cause of action against the state accrues at the time of the subject accident rather than when the 
plaintiff satisfies the threshhold requirements under this section. Jepson v. State, 846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Attorney's fees. 
- Appeal. 
Plaintiff was not required to file a cross-appeal in order to be entitled to attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal in defending his judgment for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1981). 
Claims against federal government. 
Even if the federal government could be characterized as an insurer because it provided financial 
security for its employees in regard to vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory 
arbitration under Subsection (6), since this would conflict with the administrative arrangement established 
in the Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D. Utah 
1989). 
Construction. 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group. All rights reserved. 
4 
While § 78-18-1 provides a specific basis for awarding punitive damages in cases involving a 
"tortfeasor's operation of a vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated," it makes no reference to an action for 
compensatory damages, and contains no language suggesting that the legislature intended to create an 
exception to the threshold requirements of this section. C.T. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 977 
P.2d 479. 
Household exclusion clause. 
A household or family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy is contrary to public policy 
and to the statutory requirements found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the minimum benefits provided 
by statute. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclusions in an automobile insurance policy and the purchaser 
is not informed of them in writing, those exclusions are invalid. Without disclosure, the household 
exclusion clause fails to honor the reasonable expectations of the purchaser, rendering the exclusion 
clause invalid as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
Household or family exclusions are valid in this state as to insurance provided by an automobile policy 
in excess of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 
748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987). 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsection (6), the individual who initially pays the amounts for 
which personal injury protection benefits are also available must be "another insurer." McCaffery v. Grow, 
787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitration between an uninsured victim's father and another's 
insurance company. McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Pleadings. 
Summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiffs complaint with prejudice was proper, where the 
complaint and plaintiffs deposition failed to allege any permanent disability or impairment based on 
objective findings, and, further, defendant was not required to support his motion for summary judgment 
with affidavits showing there was no permanent disability. McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
Reimbursement. 
- Recovery from insured and his insurer. 
Where passenger collected personal injury protection benefits from driver's insurer and received an 
additional settlement in an action against the driver of the other car, the insurer had no right of subrogation 
to the recovery of the passenger, but could claim reimbursement from the other driver's insurer in an 
arbitration proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
Because tortfeasors who comply with the motor vehicle insurance act are not personally responsible 
for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, a PIP insurer seeking reimbursement for PIP benefits must 
undergo mandatory binding arbitration with the liability insurer. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 
33, 978 P.2d 460. 
Insurer's obligation to continue to pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits was not extinguished 
by a settlement and release between its insured and the tortfeasor because there was no evidence that 
the parties understood or intended that the settlement include PIP benefits, and the release did not 
extinguish the insurer's right under this section to seek reimbursement for further PIP payments from the 
torfeasor's insurer through binding arbitration. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P.2d 1282 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), affd, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah 1999). 
Threshold requirements. 
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A personal injury payment (PIP) made by a plaintiffs own insurer did not establish the threshold 
amount for his medical expenses, because the mere fact that the PIP insurer paid for medical expenses 
which the jury found were not related to the accident was not binding on the defendant for purposes of 
establishing the threshold and exposing him to liability for general damages, particularly since a PIP 
carrier has a first party contractual relationship with its insured and owes that insured certain duties. C.T. 
ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479. 
Tort claims. 
- Liability of insured. 
If a party has the security required under § 31A-22-307, he is granted partial tort immunity and is not 
personally liable for the benefits provided under § 31 A-22-307, but he remains liable for customary tort 
claims of general damages and economic losses not compensated under § 31 A-22-307. Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
- Pleading and instructions. 
When injured party is entitled under threshofd provisions of this section to maintain claim for personal 
injuries not compensated by personal injury protection benefits, the injured party should plead only for 
those damages for which he has not received reparation under his first party insurance benefits; to 
present a completely factual picture to the jury, the injured party may wish to present evidence of all his 
medical bills or other economic losses; in such a case, the court, by appropriate instruction, could explain 
to the jury that those economic losses have not been included in the prayer for damages because the 
injured party has previously received reparation under his own no-fault insurance. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 
606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
Workers' compensation. 
A no-fault insurer is permitted by Subsection (3)(a) to exclude from coverage provided under its 
insurance policy any liability for injuries that are compensable under the workers' compensation statute or 
a similar statutory plan. This provision, however, is irrelevant in a proceeding before the Industrial 
Commission involving only the employee and an employer who has carried no-fault insurance but not 
workers' compensation insurance. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
A state employee who was injured in a car accident in the course of her employment was entitled to 
collect personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under this section, to the extent those benefits were not 
covered by workers' compensation. The workers* compensation exclusivity provision, § 35-1-60 (now § 
34A-2-105), does not bar such action; the provision of the state's self-insurance program excluding PIP 
benefits to any person entitled to workers' compensation benefits is not in harmony with statutory 
requirements, and is therefore invalid. Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). 
Cited in Harris v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Utah 1999). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers Under Utah's 
No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379. 
Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Note, The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah, 1989 Utah L. 
Rev. 571. 
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of "no-fault"' automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 229. 
Injury or death caused by assault as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th 
1010. 
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Who is "employed or engaged in the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of liability policy, 
55A.LR.4th261. 
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute 
mandating insurance coverage, 59 A.LR.4th 149. 
Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating 
coverage when insured obtains another policy providing similar coverage, 61 A.LR.4th 1130. 
Right of employer or workers' compensation carrier to lien against, or reimbursement out of, uninsured 
or underinsured motorist proceeds payable to employee injured by third party, 33 A.LR.5th 587. 
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1 
Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 
Actions not created. 
Arbitration. 
Assignments. 
Attorneys' duties. 
Criminal law. 
- Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
Discriminatory classification. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Health care professional immunity. 
Injury or damage to property. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
- Choses in action. 
- Habeas corpus. 
- Limitation of actions. 
- Statutory limitation of review. 
No-fault statute. 
Occupational disease law. 
Prisoners. 
- Assessment of civil fees and costs. 
- Malpractice actions. 
Remedies. 
Removal to federal court. 
Requirement of deposit. 
Sovereign immunity. 
Statutes of repose. 
Torts. 
- Action by wife against husband. 
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- Criminal conversation. 
- Loss of consortium. 
Unlicensed law practice. 
Waiver of rights. 
Workers' compensation law. 
Cited. 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et seq., is vested 
originally in the federal courts, but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by state courts is not thereby 
prohibited; in view of the provisions of this section, therefore, it was error for trial court to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the ground of forum 
non conveniens in a proper case, but such dismissal should be without prejudice so that the plaintiff might 
move his suit to another forum without harm to his claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977). 
Actions by court. 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co., 54 
Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.LR. 1119 (1919). 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the state, which 
alone can exercise sovereign powers; therefore, it does not prevent the state from reserving to itself the 
sole right to bring actions for the dissolution of building and loan associations. Union Sav. & Inv. Co. v. 
District Court, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 221, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 821 (1914). 
Actions not created. 
This section does not create new rights, or give new remedies where none otherwise are given, but 
places a limitation upon Legislature to prevent that branch of the state government from closing the doors 
of the courts against any person who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some 
known remedy. Therefore, where no right of action is given or no remedy exists, under either the common 
law or some statute, this section creates none. Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 1916A L.R.A. 
1140(1915). 
Arbitration. 
The amendment of the arbitration statute to permit valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration of 
future disputes does not violate this section. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 
1981). 
An insurer and its adjuster could not bind the insured to arbitrate any claim against the insured for any 
amount in excess of the policy limits; to do so would violate the insured's right of access to the courts 
under this section. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998). 
Assignments. 
In action for dairy products sold, plaintiff who was assignee of claim could bring action thereon even if 
claim was assigned for purpose of having action brought thereon. Perkes v. Utah Idaho Milk Co., 85 Utah 
217, 39 P.2d 308 (1934). 
Attorneys' duties. 
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This section means that courts are open for the purpose of having any order or judgment assailed in 
the proper manner and at the proper time, so that attorney with reasonable cause may act in good faith 
and challenge an order he believes to be in excess of the court's jurisdiction. In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 
190 P. 952(1920). 
Criminal law. 
- Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Former section providing that no judge, tribunal, or officer other than those mentioned therein could 
suspend execution of judgment of death except sheriff as provided in succeeding sections with reference 
to inquiry as to insanity of defendant did not violate this section. State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 
Utah 376, 49 P.2d 408 (1935). 
Debt collection. 
To collect past-due claim in court is right guaranteed by Constitution. Karenius v. Merchants' 
Protective Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 880 (1925). 
Discriminatory classification. 
A statutory classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally protected right to a 
remedy for personal injury under this section is constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than 
a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a 
valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal. Lee ex 
rel. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993). 
District court jurisdiction. 
The district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil 
and criminal, not excepted and prohibited by the Constitution. Brady v. McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 
188(1921). 
District courts are courts of original jurisdiction having jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law or 
the Constitution, but one district court cannot exercise power or control over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 
92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937). 
Election contest. 
There is no intimation herein that courts are given power to pass on purely political questions, but it is 
clearly stated that courts are always open for the enforcement of such rights and redress of such wrongs 
as from time immemorial have been considered as proper for courts to consider. The power to consider 
political questions and the vindication of rights growing out of or incidental to such questions is not an 
inherent power of the courts. Courts can exercise powers respecting political matters only to the extent 
and in the manner provided by legislature, and election contest is not within jurisdiction of court of equity in 
absence of statute. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049 (1926). 
Forum non conveniens. 
Utah state courts may apply doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions arising under Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950). 
While courts have inherent power to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction when convinced that to do so 
would work hardship on some or all the litigants, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be invoked 
only where it appears that plaintiff has selected an inconvenient forum for the purpose of annoying and 
harassing defendant, or where factors such as the location of the principal parties, ease of access to 
proof, availability of witnesses, etc., so strongly preponderate in favor of holding the trial somewhere else 
that to deny a motion to dismiss would work great hardship on defendant. Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus. 
Inc., 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977). 
Health care professional immunity. 
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Section 58-13-2, which affords immunity to a physician rendering emergency medical care at the 
scene of an emergency occurring in a hospital if the physician is under no preexisting duty to do so, does 
not violate this section. Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997). 
Injury or damage to property. 
A right of action exists for any injury or damage to private property, and neither the legislature nor 
municipalities can interfere with that right. Lewis v. Pingree Nat'l Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C 
L.R.A. 1260(1915). 
Intoxicating liquor. 
The liquor nuisance sections of the former Liquor Control Act did not contravene this section. Riggins 
v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935). 
Depriving a holder of a state liquor store lease of his liquor store without notice, hearing, or any judicial 
review offends against both the guarantee of due process and the guarantee of access to the courts. 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
Land Registration Act. 
The Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers on registrar of titles. 
Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (1920). 
Limitations. 
Former Section 78-15-3, a limitations provision in the Utah Product Liability Act which barred actions 
without regard to when an injury occurred and was not designed to provide a reasonable time within which 
to file a lawsuit, was unconstitutional because it violated this section and the constitutional prohibition 
against abrogation of wrongful death actions. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1986). 
The former architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under this 
section because it did not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy 
for vindication of his or her constitutional interest, and abrogation of the remedy was arbitrary and 
unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989). 
The former Utah architects and builders statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional under 
this section because it denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property caused by a latent defect. 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Subsection 78-12-25(3), which provides a four-year statute of limitations on "an action for relief not 
otherwise provided by law," does not violate this section. McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 835 
(D. Utah 1989), affd, 927 F.2d 1125 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 894, 112 S. Ct. 263, 116 L. Ed. 2d 
217(1991). 
- Choses in action. 
Because the acquisition of a legal malpractice claim by the law firm against which it was filed would 
have the effect of denying the claimant his right to a trial on his claim, and where there would be no 
prejudice suffered by the firm, since any judgment recovered would be offset against the legitimate 
amounts owed the firm, the public's interest in a legal system and legal profession that is just in both 
appearance and fact supported the setting aside of the acquisition of the chose by the firm. Snow, Nuffer, 
Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 49, 980 P.2d 208. 
- Habeas corpus. 
The three-month limitation period in § 78-12-31.1 is an unreasonable limitation on the constitutional 
right to petition for a habeas corpus writ that violates rights under this section to seek a civil remedy in 
state courts. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 
1994). 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group. All rights reserved. 
5 
- Limitation of actions. 
This section does not preclude the legislature from prescribing a statute of limitations for time within 
which to assail the regularity or organization of an irrigation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P. 
555(1915). 
The statute of limitations in § 35-1-99 does not, on its face, manifest a denial of justice to overcome its 
presumption of constitutionality; when a petitioner knew of his injury within the limitations period, the 
section did not violate this section. Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
- Statutory limitation of review. 
Former act authorizing improvement districts for water or sewage systems did not violate this section 
on the ground that it limited or prohibited review by the courts. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 
274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950). 
This section does not prevent the abolition of obsolete causes of action. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 
P.2d8(Utah1991). 
No-fault statute. 
The no-fault statute, § 31A-22-309, satisfies this provision because it not only provides a tort victim 
with a reasonable and alternative remedy, but also eliminates a clear social or economic evil. Warren v. 
Melville, 937 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in excluding compensation for partial disability from silicosis, and 
in rendering remedy under that act exclusive so as to abrogate common-law right of action therefor, was 
not unconstitutional as depriving employee of his remedy by due course of law for injury done to his 
person. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), appeal 
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 L Ed. 411 (1948). 
Prisoners. 
- Assessment of civil fees and costs. 
Section 64-13-23(5), directing a court to determine the amount of a prisoner's funds available for 
payment of filing fees and costs, does not unreasonably limit a prisoner's right to bring a petition for 
extraordinary relief. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
- Malpractice actions. 
Sections 63-30-4 and 63-30-10, precluding prisoners from bringing negligence actions against the 
state or prison physicians, are constitutional: while prisoners' status as felons does not justify divesting 
them of all of their rights, it does play a role in determining whether the statutory classification of prisoners 
apart from other members of society is constitutional. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996). 
Remedies. 
Where, for a period of a year and a day, the plaintiff had been barred by legislative enactments from 
all actions of the type asserted by her against a government agency and its employees, where the 
legislature had provided no alternative remedy, and where there was no clear state social or economic evil 
to be obviated by the abrogation of remedies, the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, and reversal 
of summary judgment was required. Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, 980 P.2d 
1171. 
Removal to federal court. 
Rights of litigants under this section must yield to the right of diverse defendants under federal 
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removal statutes. Copier ex rel. Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Requirement of deposit. 
To the extent that § 59-1-505, requiring a taxpayer to deposit the amount in dispute in order to obtain 
judicial review of a tax commission decision, precludes reasonable access to judicial review, it violates the 
open courts provision of this section and is unconstitutional as applied to an indigent taxpayer. However, 
the statutory requirement is not unconstitutional in all cases; for example, when a taxpayer is able to meet 
the requirement, the deposit must be paid. Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992). 
Sovereign immunity. 
Sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under this section. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 
1983); DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), afPd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). 
This section is implicated only if a statute denies a person the right to sue the state when the state 
performs a nongovernmental function. The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the 
test developed in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (1980), and has immunity under § 
63-30-10(2), immunizing government entities from suit from injuries arising out of an assault or battery; 
thus, the immunity act was not unconstitutional as applied to a person who was injured when assaulted 
and struck by an employee of the University. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
Acts that are core governmental functions or are unique to government are outside the protection of 
this section; thus, in an action against a county building official and the county for injuries based on 
negligent inspection of a building and fraudulent issuance of a building permit, the defendants' acts were 
core governmental functions within the scope of the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Subsections (3) 
and (4) of § 63-30-10. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). 
Statutes of repose. 
Given the clear social and economic evils identified by the legislature in enacting the builders' statute 
of repose, § 78-12-25.5, and the remote chance of injury or damage after a period of years, the statute is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating the stated evils, and is constitutional under this 
section. Craftsman Bldr.'s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194. 
Torts. 
- Action by wife against husband. 
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not bar wife's action against husband for the intentional 
infliction of personal injuries. Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). 
- Criminal conversation. 
Abolition of the tort of criminal conversation does not violate the open courts provision. Norton v. 
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991). 
- Loss of consortium. 
The Married Women's Act of 1898 (§ 30-2-4) was a reasonable legislative enactment intended and 
reasonably tailored to place men and women on equal footing with respect to their ability to bring actions 
for their own injuries and to extinguish the concept that a wife was the property of her husband. If, in the 
process, the husband's right to sue for loss of his wife's consortium, which may have never existed in 
Utah, was abolished, that abolition was not an unreasonable step. Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869 (Utah 
1988). 
Unlicensed law practice. 
This section does not render unconstitutional statute making practice of law without a license a crime. 
Legislature has the power to declare acts of unauthorized practice of law to be illegal, and to punish 
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violations thereof by fine and imprisonment. But the right to appear in person and prosecute or defend a 
cause to which one is a party cannot be abrogated either by the Legislature or the courts. Nelson v. Smith, 
107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634, 157 A.L.R. 512 (1944). 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of wrong is substantial right, and will not be waived by contract 
except through unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 P. 16 (1926). 
Workers' compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse to courts under Workmen's Compensation Act concerning 
question of their ultimate liability. Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825 (1918). 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid because it delegates to industrial commission the power 
to hear, consider and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their property 
rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 (1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of third party, a stranger to employment, are not limited to 
recovery under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusively, unless they have assigned their rights to 
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 (1927). 
The eight-year time limitation on temporary total disability benefits in the Worker's Compensation Law 
is not an unconstitutional statute of repose. Stoker v. Workers' Comp. Fund, 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Middlestadt v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 
1993); Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 
UTApp236,9P.3d171. 
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CHAPTER 31 
INSURANCE FRAUD ACT 
Sunset Act. - See Section 63-55-231 for the repeal date of this chapter. 
Compiler's Notes. - This chapter was enacted as Chapter 30 of this title; it was recompiled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel because of the enactment of another Chapter 30 at 
the same session. 
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31 A-31 -106. Disciplinary action. 
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31A-31-108. Assessment of insurers. 
31A-31-101. Title. 
This chapter may be cited as the "Insurance Fraud Act." 
History: C. 1953,31A-30-101, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 3; recompiled as § 31A-31-101. 
31A-31-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Authorized agency" means the attorney general, the state fire marshal, any state law 
enforcement agency, any criminal investigative department or agency of the United States, a 
district attorney, the prosecuting attorney of any municipality or county, the department, or the 
disciplinary section of an agency licensing a service provider as defined by Subsection (6); 
(2) "Financial loss" includes out-of-pocket expenses, reasonable attorney fees, repair and 
replacement costs, or claims payments. 
(3) "Insurer" means any person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, association, or 
aggregation of persons doing insurance business, as defined in Section 31 A-1-301, or subject to 
the supervision of the commissioner under Title 31 A, or any equivalent insurance supervisory 
official of another state. 
(4) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 76-2-103(2). 
(5) "Person" means an individual, firm, company, corporation, association, limited liability 
company, partnership, organization, society, business trust, service provider, or any other legal 
entity. 
(6) "Service provider" means: 
(a) an individual licensed to practice law or an individual licensed or certified by the state 
under: 
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(i) Title 31 A, Insurance Code; 
(ii) Title 41, Chapter 3, Motor Vehicle Business Regulation; 
(iii) Title 58, Occupations and Professions; or 
(iv) Title 61, Securities Division - Real Estate Division; 
(b) an individual similarly licensed in another jurisdiction; 
(c) an individual practicing any nonmedical treatment rendered in accordance with a 
recognized religious method of healing; or 
(d) a hospital, health care facility, or person whose services are compensated directly or 
indirectly by insurance. 
(7) "Statement" includes any notice., statement, proof of loss, bill of lading, receipt for 
payment, invoice, account, estimate of property damage, bill for services, diagnosis, prescription, 
hospital or doctor record, x-ray, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense, 
including a computer-generated document. 
History: C. 1953,31A-30-102, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 4; recompiled as § 31A-31-102. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
31A-31-103. Insurance fraud. 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent to deceive or 
defraud: 
(a) knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an insurer any oral or written statement or 
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains false, incomplete, or 
misleading information concerning any fact material to an application for the issuance or renewal 
of an insurance policy, certificate, or contract; 
(b) knowingly presents or causes to be presented to an insurer any oral or written statement or 
representation as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an 
insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in connection with any civil claim asserted for 
recovery of damages for personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the 
statement or representation contains false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any 
fact or thing material to the claim; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from the proceeds derived from a fraudulent insurance act; 
(d) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to commit a fraudulent insurance act; or 
(e) knowingly supplies false or fraudulent material information in any document or statement 
required by the department. 
(2) A service provider commits a fraudulent insurance act if that service provider with intent 
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to deceive or defraud: 
(a) knowingly submits or causes to be submitted a bill or request for payment containing 
charges or costs for an item or service that are substantially in excess of customary charges or 
costs for the item or service or containing itemized or delineated fees for what would customarily 
be considered a single procedure or service; 
(b) knowingly furnishes or causes to be furnished an item or service to a person substantially 
in excess of the needs of the person or of a quality that fails to meet professionally recognized 
standards; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from the proceeds derived from a fraudulent insurance act; or 
(d) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to commit a fraudulent insurance act. 
(3) An insurer commits a fraudulent insurance act if that insurer with intent to deceive or 
defraud: 
(a) knowingly withholds information or provides false or misleading information with respect 
to an application, coverage, benefits, or claims under a policy or certificate; 
(b) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to commit a fraudulent insurance act; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from the proceeds derived from a fraudulent insurance act; or 
(d) knowingly supplies false or fraudulent material information in any document or statement 
required by the department. 
(4) An insurer or service provider is not liable for any fraudulent insurance act committed by 
an employee without the authority of the insurer or service provider unless the insurer or service 
provider knew or should have known of the fraudulent insurance act. 
History: C. 1953,31A-30-103, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 5; recompiled as § 31A-31-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
31A-31-104. Disclosure of information. 
(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (2), upon written request by an insurer to an authorized agency, 
the authorized agency may release to the insurer information or evidence that is relevant to any 
suspected insurance fraud. 
(b) Upon written request by an authorized agency to an insurer, the insurer or an agent 
authorized by the insurer to act on the insurer's behalf shall release to the authorized agency 
information or evidence that is relevant to any suspected insurance fraud. 
(2) (a) Any information or evidence furnished to an authorized agency under this section 
may be classified as a protected record in accordance with Subsection 63-2-304(8) of the 
Government Records Access and Management Act. 
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(b) Any information or evidence furnished to an insurer under this section is not subject to 
discovery in a civil proceeding unless, after reasonable notice to any insurer, agent, or any 
authorized agency that has an interest in the information and subsequent hearing, a court 
determines that the public interest and any ongoing criminal investigation will not be jeopardized 
by the disclosure. 
(c) An insurer shall report to the department agency terminations based upon a violation of 
this chapter. 
History: C. 1953,31A-30-104, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 6; recompiled as § 31A-31-104. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Ellingsworth, 966 P.2d 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
31A-31-105. Immunity. 
(1) A person, insurer, or authorized agency is immune from civil action, civil penalty, or 
damages when in good faith that person, insurer, or authorized agency cooperates with, furnishes 
evidence, provides or receives information regarding suspected insurance fraud to or received 
from: 
(a) the department or any division of the department; 
(b) any federal, state, or government agency established to detect and prevent insurance 
fraud; or 
(c) any agent, employee, or designee of an entity listed in Subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b). 
(2) A person, insurer, or authorized agency is immune from civil action, civil penalty, or 
damages if that person, insurer, or authorized agency complies in good faith with a court order to 
provide evidence or testimony requested by the entities described in Subsections (l)(a) through 
d)(c). 
(3) This section does not abrogate or modify common law or statutory rights, privileges, or 
immunities enjoyed by any person or entity. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, a person, insurer, or service provider 
is not immune from civil action, civil penalty or damages under this section if that person 
commits the fraudulent insurance act that is the subject of the information. 
History: C. 1953,31A-30-105, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 7; recompiled as § 31A-31-105. 
31A-31-106. Disciplinary action. 
(1) If, after giving notice and a hearing conducted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, the commissioner finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
a person licensed under Title 31A has committed a fraudulent insurance act, the commissioner 
may suspend or revoke the license issued under Title 31 A. 
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(2) If the appropriate licensing authority finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
service provider violated Section 31A-31-103, the service provider is subject to revocation or 
suspension of the service provider's license. 
(3) The commissioner may notify the appropriate licensing authority of conduct by a service 
provider that the commissioner believes may constitute a fraudulent insurance act. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-30-106, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 8; recompiled as § 31A-31-106; 
1995, ch, 20, § 69. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Section 31A-31-103" 
for "Section 31A-30-103" in Subsection (2). 
31A-31-107. Workers1 compensation insurance fraud. 
In any action involving workers* compensation insurance, Section 34A-2-110 supersedes this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953,31A-30-107, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 9; recompiled as § 31A-31-107; 
1996, ch. 240, § 18; 1997, ch. 375, § 20. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "35A-3-114" for 
"35-1-109." 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "34A-2-110" for "35A-3-114." 
31A-31-108. Assessment of insurers. 
(1) To implement this chapter, Section 34A-2-110, and Section 76-6-521, the commissioner 
may assess each admitted insurer and each nonadmitted insurer transacting insurance under 
Chapter 15, Parts 1 and 2, an annual fee as follows: 
(a) $75 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of $1,000,000 or less; 
(b) $263 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $2,500,000 but more 
than $1,000,000; 
(c) $563 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $5,000,000 but more 
than $2,500,000; 
(d) $1,125 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $10,000,000 but 
more than $5,000,000; 
(e) $4,500 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of less than $50,000,000 but 
more than $10,000,000; and 
(f) $11,250 for an insurer with total premiums for Utah risks of $50,000,000 or more. 
(2) All money received by the state under this section shall be deposited in the General Fund 
as a nonlapsing dedicated credit of the Insurance Department for the purpose of providing funds 
to pay for any costs and expenses incurred by the Insurance Department in the administration, 
investigation, and enforcement of this chapter, Section 34A-2-110, and Section 76-6-521. 
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(3) As used in this section, "Utah risks" means insurance coverage on the lives, health, or 
against the liability of persons residing in Utah, or on property located in Utah, other than 
property temporarily in transit through Utah. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-30-108, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 243, § 10; recompiled as § 
31A-31-108; 1996, ch. 240, § 19; 1997, ch. 185, § 18; 1997, ch. 375, § 21. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "the provisions o f and 
substituted "35A-3-114" for "35-1-109" in Subsections (1) and (2). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 185, effective July 1, 1997, increased the annual fees in Subsections 
(1)(a)to(1)(f). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, substituted M34A-2-110" for "35A-3-114" in 
Subsections (1) and (2). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "the provisions o f and substituted "35A-3-114" 
for "35-1-109" in Subsections (1) and (2). 
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31A-26-301. Timely payment of claims. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall timely pay every valid insurance 
claim made by an insured. By rule the commissioner may prescribe the kinds of notice and proof 
of loss that will establish validity, the manner in which an insurer may make a bona fide denial of 
a claim, the periods of time within which payment is required to be made to be timely, and the 
reasonable interest rates to be charged upon late claim payments. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the payment of a claim is not overdue during any period 
in which the insurer is unable to pay the claim because there is no recipient legally able to give a 
valid release for the payment, or in which the insurer is unable to determine who is entitled to 
receive the payment, provided that the insurer has promptly notified the claimant of the inability 
and has offered in good faith to pay the claim promptly when the inability is removed. 
(3) This section applies only to claims made by claimants in direct privity of contract with 
the insurer. 
History: C. 1953,31A-26-301, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31. 
Link to 2001 Legislation Affecting this Section 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-126, R590-190, R590-191, R590-192. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Liability insurance: third party's right of action for insurer's bad-faith tactics designed to delay 
payment of claim, 62 A.L.R.4th 1113. 
Policy provision limiting time within which action may be brought on the policy as applicable to tort 
action by insured against insurer, 66 A.L.R.4th 859. 
Insurer's liability to insurance agent or broker for damages suffered as result of insurer's denial of 
coverage or refusal to pay policy proceeds to insured, 6 A.L.R.5th 611. 
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31A-26-303. Unfair claim settlement practices. 
(1) No insurer or person representing an insurer may engage in any unfair claim settlement 
practice under Subsections (2), (3), and (4). 
(2) Each of the following acts is an unfair claim settlement practice: 
(a) knowingly misrepresenting material facts or the contents of insurance policy provisions at 
issue in connection with a claim under an insurance contract; however, this provision does not 
include the failure to disclose information; 
(b) attempting to use a policy application which was altered by the insurer without notice to, 
or knowledge, or consent of, the insured as the basis for settling or refusing to settle a claim; or 
(c) failing to settle a claim promptly under one portion of the insurance policy coverage, 
where liability and the amount of loss are reasonably clear, in order to influence settlements 
under other portions of the insurance policy coverage, but this Subsection (2)(c) applies only to 
claims made by persons in direct privity of contract with the insurer. 
(3) Each of the following is an unfair claim settlement practice if committed or performed 
with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice by an insurer or persons 
representing an insurer: 
(a) failing to acknowledge and act promptly upon communications about claims under 
insurance policies; 
(b) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and 
processing of claims under insurance policies; 
(c) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance 
policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by 
those insureds when the amounts claimed were reasonably near to the amounts recovered; 
(d) failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon request by 
them, of the coverage under which payment was made; 
(e) failing to promptly provide to the insured a reasonable explanation of the basis for denial 
of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement; 
(f) appealing from substantially all arbitration awards in favor of insureds for the purpose of 
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises for less than the amount awarded in 
arbitration; 
(g) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or the 
physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and then requiring the subsequent 
submission of formal proof of loss forms wrhich contain substantially the same information; or 
(h) not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of 
claims in which liability is reasonably clear. 
(4) The commissioner may define by rule, acts or general business practices which are unfair 
claim settlement practices, after a finding that those practices are misleading, deceptive, unfairly 
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discriminatory, overreaching, or an unreasonable restraint on competition. 
(5) This section does not create any private cause of action. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-26-303, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31; 1986, ch. 204, § 218; 1987, 
ch. 91, § 61. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-190, R590-191, R590-192. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. 
This section and the rules promulgated under it do not give rise to a private cause of action. Cannon v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 UT App 10, 994 P.2d 824, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Liability of independent or public insurance adjuster to insured for conduct in adjusting claim, 
50 A.LR.4th 900. 
Duty of insurer to pay for independent counsel when conflict of interest exists between insured and 
insurer, 50 A.L.R.4th 932. 
Liability insurer's post-loss conduct as waiver of, or estoppel to assert, "no-action" clause, 68 
A.LR.4th 389. 
Liability of insurer to insured for settling third-party claim within policy limits resulting in detriment to 
insured, 18 A.LR.5th 474. 
Pre-emption by Longshore and Harbor Workers1 Compensation Act (33 USCS §§901 et seq.) of state 
law claims for bad-faith dealing by insurer or agent of insurer, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 723. 
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31A-2-308. Enforcement penalties and procedures. 
(1) (a) A person who violates any insurance statute or rule or any order issued under 
Subsection 31A-2-201(4) shall forfeit to the state twice the amount of any profit gained from the 
violation, in addition to any other forfeiture or penalty imposed. 
(b) (i) The commissioner may order an individual agent, broker, adjuster, or insurance 
consultant who violates an insurance statute or rule to forfeit to the state not more than $2,500 for 
each violation. 
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person who violates an insurance statute or rule to 
forfeit to the state not more than $5,000 for each violation. 
(c) (i) The commissioner may order an individual agent, broker, adjuster, or insurance 
consultant who violates an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4) to forfeit to the state not 
more than $2,500 for each violation. Each day the violation continues is a separate violation. 
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person who violates an order issued under 
Subsection 31A-2-201(4) to forfeit to the state not more than $5,000 for each violation. Each day 
the violation continues is a separate violation. 
(d) The commissioner may accept or compromise any forfeiture under this Subsection (1) 
until after a complaint is filed under Subsection (2). After the filing of the complaint, only the 
attorney general may compromise the forfeiture. 
(2) When a person fails to comply with an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4), 
including a forfeiture order, the commissioner may file an action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction or obtain a court order or judgment: 
(a) enforcing the commissioner's order; 
(b) (i) directing compliance with the commissioner's order and restraining further violation of 
the order; and 
(ii) subjecting the person ordered to the procedures and sanctions available to the court for 
punishing contempt if the failure to comply continues; or 
(c) imposing a forfeiture in an amount the court considers just, up to $10,000 for each day the 
failure to comply continues after the filing of the complaint until judgment is rendered. 
(3) The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern actions brought under Subsection (2), except 
that the commissioner may file a complaint seeking a court-ordered forfeiture under Subsection 
(2)(c) no sooner than two weeks after giving written notice of the commissioner's intention to 
proceed under Subsection (2)(c). The commissioner's order issued under Subsection 
31A-2-201(4) may contain a notice of intention to seek a court-ordered forfeiture if the 
commissioner's order is disobeyed. 
(4) If, after a court order is issued under Subsection (2), the person fails to comply with the 
commissioner's order or judgment: 
(a) the commissioner may certify the fact of the failure to the court by affidavit; and 
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(b) the court may, after a hearing following at least five days written notice to the parties 
subject to the order or judgment, amend the order or judgment to add the forfeiture or forfeitures, 
as prescribed in Subsection (2)(c), until the person complies. 
(5) (a) The proceeds of all forfeitures under this section, including collection expenses, shall 
be paid into the General Fund. 
(b) The expenses of collection shall be credited to the Insurance Department's budget. 
(c) The attorney general's budget shall be credited to the extent the Insurance Department 
reimburses the attorney general's office for its collection expenses under this section. 
(6) (a) Forfeitures and judgments under this section bear interest at the rate charged by the 
United States Internal Revenue Service for past due taxes on the: 
(i) date of entry of the commissioner's order under Subsection (1); or 
(ii) date of judgment under Subsection (2). 
(b) Interest accrues from the later of the dates described in Subsection (6)(a) until the 
forfeiture and accrued interest are fully paid. 
(7) A forfeiture may not be imposed under Subsection (2)(c) if: 
(a) at the time the forfeiture action is commenced, the person was in compliance with the 
commissioner's order; or 
(b) the violation of the order occurred during the order's suspension. 
(8) The commissioner may seek an injunction as an alternative to issuing an order under 
Subsection 31A-2-201(4). 
(9) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that person: 
(i) intentionally violates: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4); 
(ii) intentionally permits a person over whom that person has authority to violate: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4); or 
(iii) intentionally aids any person in violating: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-201(4). 
(b) Unless a specific criminal penalty is provided elsewhere in this title, the person may be 
fined not more than: 
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(i) $10,000 if a corporation; or 
(ii) $5,000 if a person other than a corporation. 
(c) If the person is an individual, the person may, in addition, be imprisoned for up to one 
year. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (9), "intentionally" has the same meaning as under Subsection 
76-2-103(1). 
(10) (a) After a hearing, the commissioner may, in whole or in part, revoke, suspend, place 
on probation, limit, or refuse to renew the licensee's license or certificate of authority: 
(i) when a licensee of the department, other than a domestic insurer: 
(A) persistently or substantially violates the insurance law; or 
(B) violates an order of the commissioner under Subsection 31A-2-201 (4); 
(ii) if there are grounds for delinquency proceedings against the licensee under Section 
31A-27-301 or Section 31A-27-307; or 
(iii) if the licensee's methods and practices in the conduct of the licensee's business endanger, 
or the licensee's financial resources are inadequate to safeguard, the legitimate interests of the 
licensee's customers and the public. 
(b) Additional license termination or probation provisions for licensees other than insurers 
are set forth in Sections 31A-19a-303, 31A-19a-304, 31A-23-216, 31A-23-217, 31A-25-208, 
31A-25-209, 31A-26-213, 31A-26-214, 31A-35-501, and 31A-35-503. 
(11) The enforcement penalties and procedures set forth in this section are not exclusive, but 
are cumulative of other rights and remedies the commissioner has pursuant to applicable law. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-2-308, enacted bv L. 1986, ch. 204, § 25; 1987, ch. 91; § 6; 1987, ch. 
161, § 78; 1991, ch. 241, § 23; 1994, ch. 316, § 5; 1998, ch. 293, § 2; 1999, ch. 130, § 2; 1999, 
ch. 131, § 4. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-190, R590-191, R590-192. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986, ch. 204, § 25, repealed former § 31A-2-308, as enacted 
by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 7, relating to enforcement penalties and procedures, and enacted present § 
31A-2-308. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, updated the references at the 
end of Subsection (10), making a related change. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 130, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "Sections 31A-19a-303, 
31A-19a-304M for "Sections 31A-19-303, 31A-19-304" in Subsection (10) (Subsection (10)(b) in the 
reconciled version) and made a stylistic change. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 131, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote Subsections (9) and (10), 
redesignated subsections, and made stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
No right of private action. 
Neither Subsection (1)(a) nor state case law provides for any private action in the case of violation of 
the state insurance regulations, nor do they provide for any private remedy. Johnson v. Life Investors Ins. 
Co. of Am., 996 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Utah 1998). 
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §§ 25, 54. 
C.J.S. - 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 91 et seq. 
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31A-21-312. Notice and proof of loss. 
(1) Every insurance policy shall provide that: 
(a) when notice of loss is required separately from proof of loss, notice given by or on behalf 
of the insured to any authorized agent of the insurer within this state, with particulars sufficient 
to identify the policy, is notice to the insurer; and 
(b) failure to give any notice or file any proof of loss required by the policy within the time 
specified in the policy does not invalidate a claim made by the insured, if the insured shows that 
it was not reasonably possible to give the notice or file the proof of loss within the prescribed 
time and that notice was given or proof of loss filed as soon as reasonably possible. 
(2) Failure to give notice or file proof of loss as required by Subsection (l)(b) does not bar 
recovery under the policy if the insurer fails to show it was prejudiced by the failure. This 
subsection may not be construed to extend the statute of limitations applicable under Section 
31A-21-313. 
(3) The insurer shall, on request, promptly furnish an insured any forms or instructions 
needed to make a proof of loss. 
(4) As an alternative to giving notice directly under Subsection (l)(a), it is a sufficient 
service of notice or of proof of loss if a first class postage prepaid envelope addressed to the 
insurer and containing the proper notice or proof of loss is deposited in any United States post 
office within the time prescribed. 
(5) The commissioner shall adopt rules dealing with notice of loss and proof of loss time 
limitations under insurance policies. Under Section 31A-21-202, the commissioner's express 
approval must be received before any contract clause requiring notice of loss or proof of loss in a 
manner inconsistent with the rule may be used in an insurance contract. 
(6) The acknowledgment by the insurer of the receipt of notice, the furnishing of forms for 
filing proofs of loss, the acceptance of those proofs, or the investigation of any claim are not 
alone sufficient to waive any of the rights of the insurer in defense of any claim arising under the 
insurance policy. 
History: C. 1953,31A-21-312, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 148. 
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority 
for the following administrative rule(s): R590-190, R590-191, R590-192. 
Cross-References. - Reports of fires of suspicious origin, § 53-7-214. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Failure to file proof of loss. 
Filing notice of claim. 
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Failure to file proof of loss. 
Insured, who suffered irrecoverable, entire loss of sight in one eye within a few days after a fall, could 
not delay the filing of his proof of loss for nearly three years on ground that he personally did not admit or 
realize his loss was irrecoverable. Hunter v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Filing notice of claim. 
Although notice of claim and proof of loss have similarities, the two are distinct, and fact that notice 
may have been given does not dispense with requirement of furnishing formal proof of loss. Hunter v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1971). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1323 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1245 et seq. 
A.L.R. - Necessity and sufficiency of insurer's demand, under fire insurance policy, for examination of 
insured or his books or papers, or for proofs of loss, certificates, or sworn statements, 4 A.L.R.3d 631. 
Time within which demand for appraisal of property loss must be made, under insurance policy 
providing for such appraisal, 14 A.L.R.3d 674. 
Overvaluation in proof of loss of property insured as fraud avoiding fire insurance policy, 16 A.L.R.3d 
774. 
Disability insurance or provision: clause requiring notice of claim within specified time or as soon as 
reasonably possible, or the like, 17 A.L.R.3d 530. 
"Physical damage": provisions of burglary or theft policy requiring losses evidenced by "physical 
damage to premises,", 22 A.L.R.3d 1305. 
Insured's ignorance of loss or casualty, cause of damage, coverage or existence of policy, or identity 
of insurer, as affecting or excusing compliance with requirements as to time for giving notice, making proof 
of loss, or bringing action against insurer, 24 A.L.R.3d 1007. 
Necessity and sufficiency of notice of and hearing in proceedings before appraisers and arbitrators 
appointed to determine amount of loss, 25 A.L.R.3d 680. 
Beneficiary's ignorance of existence of life or accident policy as excusing failure to give notice, make 
proofs of loss, or bring action within time limited by policy or statute, 28 A.L.R.3d 292. 
Notice or proof of loss under one policy as notice or proof of loss under another provision of same 
policy or another policy issued by same insurer, 29 A.L.R.3d 856. 
Trivial nature of personal injury as excusing compliance with liability insurance policy provision 
requiring notice to insurer, 39 A.L.R.3d 593. 
Timeliness of notice of accident by additional insured, 47 A.L.R.3d 199. 
Policy provision limiting time within which action may be brought on the policy as applicable to tort 
action by insured against insurer, 66 A.L.R.4th 859. 
Requirement under property insurance policy that insured submit to examination under oath as to 
loss, 16A.LR.5th412. 
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POLITICS & POLICY 
HMO Fracas Moves to Who Makes Medical Decisions 
John Ciinfce 
By LAURIE MCGINLEY 
Staff Reporter of THF. WAI.I. STREKT JOURNAL 
WASHINGTON-Doctors and insurers 
are squaring off over the latest hot-button 
issue in the patients' rights battle: Who 
gets to decide when treatment is medically 
necessary? 
The American Medical Association and 
Democratic allies in Congress want to 
make it much harder for managed-care 
plans to overrule the judgment of treating 
physicians about what constitutes med-
ically necessary and appropriate care. 
Health plans, backed mainly by Republi-
cans, say such a move would dismantle 
managed care and lead to higher costs and 
diminished quality 
"This fight is about who controls the 
health-care system-the physicians or the 
health plans," says 
Robert Laszewski, 
a health-care-policy 
consultant. 
The fracas sig-
nals an escalation of 
the battle over pa-
tient-protection pro-
posals, which will be 
high on the agenda 
when Congress re-
turns next week. 
The Health Benefits 
Coalition-business 
groups and insurers 
that oppose federal 
regulation of health 
plans-already has begun airing radio ads 
in half a dozen cities, including Tampa, 
Ha., and Cincinnati, urging lawmakers to 
oppose HMO-overhaul legislation. 
And, on another front, the U.S. Labor 
Department is conducting hearings this 
week on proposals to require employer-
sponsored health plans to speed up their 
handling of appeals from patients whose 
claims for treatment are denied. 
Historically, insurers have agreed to 
cover services deemed medically, neces-
sary and appropriate but haven't defined 
those terms. For decades, treating physi-
cians decided what was necessary and 
were rarely challenged. But as costs began 
to rise several years ago, health plans, as 
well as government programs such as 
Medicare, began reviewing doctors' med-
ical-necessity decisions. 
The result: a "radical shift," says Sara 
Rosenbaum, a George Washington Univer-
sity health-policy professor who recently 
wrote about the subject in the New England 
Journal of Medicine. "Insurers now rou-
tinely make treatment decisions by deter-
mining what goods and services they will 
pay for." 
Restrictive Care Definitions 
In addition, she says, some insurers 
have begun adopting restrictive defini-
tions of what constitutes medically neces-
sary care. One company, she says, defined 
it in a contract as care that "is absolutely 
essential and indispensable for assuring 
the health and safety of the patient," even 
though such a stringent standard is at odds 
with prudent medical practice. 
Critics of managed care point to the case 
of Ethan Bedrick to support their argu-
ments that the federal government needs to 
weigh in on the medical-necessity issue. 
Born with severe cerebral palsy, the young 
Mr. Bedrick required intensive physical 
therapy to avoid muscle deterioration. 
But when he was a little more than a 
year old, a utilization reviewei for Travel-
ers Insurance Co. sharply cut back on the 
therapy, saying it wasn't medically neces-
sary. She cited a single study in a medical 
journal to support her conclusion that the 
therapy wouldn't lead to a marked improve-
ment in the boy. A federal appeals court in 
Richmond, Va., in 1906 sharply disagreed 
with the reviewers definition of medical 
necessity, saying it was as important to pre-
vent the youngster's physical deterioration 
as to improve it. The court ordered the in-
tensive therapy regimen resumed. 
Now, some members of Congress are 
trying to increase physicians leverage in 
dealing with health plans. A Democratic 
bill by Michigan Rep. John Dmgell and 
Massachusetts Sen. Edward Kennedy, and 
a bipartisan one by GOP Sen. John Chafee 
of Rhode Island say that health plans may 
not "arbitrarily interfere with or alter the 
decision of the treating physician," as long 
as the recommended services are med-
ically necessary. 
And services are medically necessary, 
according to the bills, if they are "consis-
tent with generally accepted principles of 
professional medical practice." 
Objective Standard 
Proponents say the provisions would 
ensure that doctors aren't overruled solely 
because of cost considerations. In addition, 
they argue, the provisions would provide 
an objective standard to be used by inde-
pendent review panels, which would be set 
up under both Democratic and Republican 
patient-protection measures. These panels 
would scrutinize treatment denials to see if 
they should be reversed. 
Without the "objective, time-tested 
standard of professional medical prac-
tice," the independent appeals panels 
"will be nothing more than a false 
promise," Sen. Chafee warns. 
But the insurance industry and its al-
lies, the employer groups, argue that bar-
ring plans from altering decisions by treat-
ing physicians would spell the end of man-
aged care. Doctors, they say, would have 
carte blanche to order unneeded tests and 
services, all without unwelcome second-
guessing from health plans. 
"This is all a subterfuge to have the doc-
tors get what they really want, which is un-
limited fee-for-service medicine," says 
Dean Rosen, a senior vice president at the 
Health Insurance Association of America. 
The medical-necessity provision, ac-
cording to an estimate prepared for the in-
dustry, would raise the costs of managed-
care plans 4% to 6%; some analysts think the 
actual cost could be much higher. In the past, 
letting doctors have the last word on what is 
medically necessary "drove us to have the 
most expensive health-care' system in the 
known universe," says David Abernethy, a 
lobbyist for New York-based HIP Health 
Plans. The National Association of Manu-
facturers recently described the "medical 
necessity" provisions as a "poison pill," 
along with language making it easier for in-
jured consumers to sue their health plans. 
Banking Authorities Likely to Abandon 
^sal to Thwart Money Laundering 
HMO Migration 
Percentage of employees enrolled in traditional 
insurance and in managed-care plans 
Note Data are for companies with 10 or more 
employees, numbers may add up to more than 100% 
because of dual enrollment 
Source William M Mercer Inc 
Rick Smith, vice president for public pol-
icy and research for the American Associa-
tion of Health Plans, which represents more 
than 1,000 HMOs and other managed-care 
plans, also warns that the pioposals would 
lock in physician practices that represent 
the lowest common denominator. Health 
plans, he says, would lose their ability to 
challenge doctors to abandon outmoded, 
even dangerous practices, ranging from an 
overuse of Caesarean sections to an under-
use of beta blockers for heart attack victims. 
And insurance-industry and GOP offi-
cials dispute Democratic assertions that 
the "medical necessity" provisions are 
needed to ensure a strong independent-re-
view process. One Republican aide says it is 
in the GOP's interest to enact strong ap-
peals procedures in order to deflect Democ-
ratic demands for expanded HMO liability. 
These officials also contend that much of 
the argument comes down to public rela-
tions. "The political line tests well that doc-
tors, not insurance burenicrats, should 
make medical decisions," says Mr. Rosen, 
adding that physicians within the managed-
care companies are the "bureaucrats" 
making medical-necessity decisions. 
Amid the debate. Sen. Chafee is trying to 
position his bipartisan bill ris a compromise 
to GOP proposals, even though the business 
and insurance groups don't see it as one. If 
there is a dispute between a physician and a 
health plan over whether care is needed, he 
says, both sides should pi esent the scien-
tific evidence to back their positions-and 
let the independent experts decide. 
His goal, he says, isn't to make insurers 
pay for services that aren't covered bene-
fits, but to make sure that "patients get 
what they pay for." 
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Third Judicial District 
FEB - 6 2001 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE VOY TUCKER and MARIAN TUCKER, 
individually and on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, STEPHEN P. MARBLE, 
M.D., MA YE HELEN POTTER, and FARMERS 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 980907369 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
On January 22, 2001, Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's 
("State Farm") Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint came for hearing before the Court, with the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment also came before the Court. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Trent J. Waddoups. Defendant State Farm was represented by Alan L. Sullivan 
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Alan L.Sullivan (3152) 
Adrianne Goldsmith (8182) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company 
and Adrianne Goldsmith. The Court has considered the terms of the insurance policy under 
which the plaintiffs were insured at the time of the accident. The Court also has considered the 
admissions of plaintiffs' counsel at argument. Because these matters have been presented to and 
considered by the Court, the Court has exercised its discretion to treat State Farm's motion to 
dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At the close of the hearing, the Court granted judgment in favor of State Farm on the 
basis of State Farm's motion to dismiss, denied plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion 
to Dismiss, and denied plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The following facts are alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint, appear in the plaintiffs' 
insurance policy, or were admitted by plaintiffs: 
1. On August 5, 1994, plaintiffs Dee Voy and Marian Tucker were involved in an 
automobile accident with Maye Helen Potter. 
2. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs were insured under a State Farm automobile 
insurance policy. 
3. Plaintiffs' automobile insurance policy provided that State Farm would reimburse 
plaintiffs for the reasonable value of all necessary medical expenses incurred by plaintiffs up to 
$3,000.00 per person in connection with a covered accident. 
4. Plaintiffs alleged significant back and neck injuries resulting from this accident, for 
which they each sought medical treatment. 
5. Plaintiffs' medical providers performed various tests and treatments in the spring of 
1996 to alleviate plaintiffs' alleged injuries, thereby causing plaintiffs to incur medical expenses. 
6. Plaintiffs submitted their medical bills to State Farm for reimbursement. 
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7. Plaintiffs' insurance policy provided that an insured who made a claim against the 
policy would be required to undergo a medical examination by a physician chosen and retained 
by State Farm as often as State Farm reasonably required. 
8. Per plaintiffs' policy, State Farm required plaintiffs to undergo a medical examination 
by Dr. Stephen Marble to determine whether the claimed medical expenses were reasonable and 
necessary. 
9. On October 22, 1996, after examining the patients and reviewing their medical 
records, Dr. Marble concluded that Dee Voy Tucker's injuries arose from and were related to the 
automobile accident. With respect to Mr. Tucker's medical expenses, Dr. Marble stated that one 
set of x-rays was duplicative and therefore unnecessary. 
10. Dr. Marble concluded that Marian Tucker's injuries did not arise from the accident, 
and, instead, were related to a pre-existing condition. 
11. In November 1996, based upon Dr. Marble's conclusions, State Farm declined to 
reimburse plaintiffs for all of their claimed medical expenses. State Farm reimbursed plaintiffs 
only for those expenses deemed reasonable and necessary. 
12. Plaintiffs filed suit against Ms. Potter on July 23, 1998 for negligence. 
13. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on September 12, 2000 to include State Farm as a 
defendant. 
14. Plaintiffs alleged in their Amended Complaint that State Farm did not meet its 
obligation under Utah's personal injury protection statute (the "no fault" statute), see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 31A-22-307 to -309 (2000), to reimburse plaintiffs for their claimed medical expenses. 
15. In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs alleged that State Farm's retention of Dr. 
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Marble to conduct a medical examination, and State Farm's denial of coverage based upon the 
results of that examination, were unlawful. Plaintiffs have asserted claims for declaratory 
judgment, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and 
fraud. 
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed 
to state claims for which relief may be granted, and that State Farm is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The Court's ruling is based on two independent grounds. First, plaintiffs have 
failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to conduct medical examinations to 
determine whether claimed medical expenses are reasonable and necessary. Second, plaintiffs' 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance contract actions. Specifically, 
the Court concludes as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that it is unlawful for State Farm to limit or deny 
coverage of an insured based upon the findings of a medical examination by a physician retained 
by State Farm. 
(a) Each of plaintiffs' claims rests upon the incorrect assumption that it is 
unlawful under both Utah law and the plaintiffs' insurance policy for State Farm 
to retain a physician to conduct a medical examination of an insured, and to limit 
or deny coverage to an insured on the basis of that examination. 
(b) Utah's no-fault statute provides personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits 
to cover "the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical... services, 
not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(a). 
Plaintiffs' insurance policy contains language to the same effect. Thus, under 
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Utah law and the parties' agreement, State Farm is obligated to reimburse 
plaintiffs only for those medical expenses that are reasonable, necessary, and 
related to a covered automobile accident. 
(c) It is neither improper nor unlawful for an insurer to conduct medical 
examinations and to limit or deny coverage to its insureds on the basis of those 
examinations. The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly condoned the use of such 
medical examinations to determine whether claimed medical expenses are 
reasonable and necessary. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co. et al., 973 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1998). Such examinations allow insurers to determine whether an insured's 
medical expenses are reasonable, necessary, and related to the accident. 
2. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations governing insurance 
contract actions. 
(a) Under Utah law, a party must bring an action based upon a contract of first 
party insurance within three years from the date of the inception of the loss. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (2000). The date of the inception of the loss is 
when the first loss is incurred. See Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K & T, Inc., 745 
F. Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990) (applying Utah law). In a case involving the 
alleged failure to pay PIP benefits, the first loss is incurred no later than the date 
on which the insurer refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits. 
(b) Plaintiffs first incurred their alleged losses in 1996, when State Farm first 
declined to pay the disputed PIP benefits. Plaintiffs did not file suit against State 
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Farm until September 12,2000, more than three years after the inception of the 
loss. 
(c) Each of plaintiffs' claims rests in contract, not in tort. See Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (holding that in a first 
party insurance relationship, the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual, rather than fiduciary). All of plaintiffs' claims are based upon the 
insurance policy. None of the duties or obligations allegedly owed to plaintiffs by 
State Farm exists independently of the insurance policy. In addition, the "no 
fault" statute provides that a person entitled to PEP benefits may bring an action in 
contract to recover medical expenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(5)(d). 
The "no fault" statute does not provide means by which a plaintiff may sue the 
insurer in tort. 
3. As to each of plaintiffs' claims against State Farm, plaintiffs have failed to state a 
claim for which relief may be granted, and State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. Defendant State Farm's Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby granted; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike State Farm's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby denied; and 
4. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action in plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
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5. Defendant State Farm is hereby awarded its costs of court incurred in connection 
with this action. 
6. The Court hereby certifies this judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 30, 2000, this Court ordered that plaintiffs' claims 
against defendant Maye Helen Potter be severed from plaintiffs' claims against State Farm, 
Farmers Insurance Exchange and Stephen P. Marble, M.D. The Court also ordered a separate 
trial to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. Certification of this judgment is 
appropriate because there is no significant factual overlap between the claims asserted by 
plaintiffs against Ms. Potter, and those asserted by plaintiffs against State Farm. Plaintiffs' 
claims against Ms. Potter concern liability, whereas plaintiffs' claims against State Farm 
concern coverage. Thus, the outcome of any appeal of this judgment would not have a res 
judicata effect on plaintiffs' claims against Ms. Potter. See, e.g., Bennion v. Pennzoil Co. et al., 
826 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1992) (setting forth requirements for proper certification under Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) (citation omitted). 
DATED this (P day of February, 2001. 
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APPROVED ASJEQFORM: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
Counsel for Plaintiffs Z-Z-D/ 
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CiS 
CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the C& day of February, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, first-
class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR DISMISSAL to 
the following: 
Adrianne Goldsmith, Esq. 
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. 
Gateway Tower West, Suite 1200 
15 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Trent J. Waddoups, Esq. 
Carr & Waddoups 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Harold L. Petersen 
Petersen & Hansen 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David A. Greenwood, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Kevin Simon 
Epperson & Rencher 
10W. 100 S. #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^"V^ai^ 
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Exhibit I 
1st-3rd Week 4th 
Week 
MANIPULATION 
•5 treatments per 
week are allowed 
during the acute 
phase (First 3 
weeks from, the 
date of loss) 
5th- 8th 
Viteek 
9th- 12th 
Week 
&*+4 
13th- 16th 
Week 
-3 treatments 
per week are 
allowed, 
during the 
4th week 
-2 treatments 
per week are 
allowed 
during 
weeks 5-8 
•1 treatment 
perweekare"Ifireatmcnt 
allowed 
during 
weeks 9-12 
The treatments are to begin and end by the 
J g g f f L g g ^ date ofIoss 
TREATMENTS MAY NOT E X C E E l / J S ^ 
T
*ra l A MOUNT OF TREATMFNTQ iur A V *.~~ ¥ 
w
 A tuj.A 4 m t m S M A Y N O T £ X C E E D 2 6 
per week 
every 14 
days during 
weeks 13-16 
